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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a state legislature enacted a law making any theft a
crime punishable by twenty years' imprisonment. Within this law was
a provision precluding an accused from introducing evidence that he
unwittingly took property to which he was not entitled. Suppose
further that after this law was enacted, an elderly woman hung her
black coat in a restaurant's lobby and, upon leaving, mistakenly
retrieved another's black coat.1 Under the hypothetical statute, her
mistake could neither hinder the prosecution's case against her nor be
asserted by her as a defense. By inadvertently taking another's coat
from a crowded restaurant, the woman could and would be convicted
and sentenced to a mandatory twenty years in prison.
Most would argue that such a statute would be egregious-it
seems inconceivable that a legislature could turn an otherwise simple
mistake into a top-level felony. However, most states have statutes or
judicial rules with a similar effect in the area of sex crimes against
children. 2 Nearly every jurisdiction prevents a person accused of
engaging in sexual intercourse with a child from introducing evidence
that he did so under the mistaken belief that his paramour was above
the age of consent, yet there is hardly the public outcry of injustice
that one would expect if the hypothetical theft statute were enacted.
On one hand, this is completely understandable. Protecting our
children is of fundamental importance to our society, and rape, as the
Supreme Court has said, is "the ultimate violation of self."3 Sexual
predators who prey on children are considered among the most
deviant members of society. Most, if not all, people rest easier
knowing that anyone who engages in such activities is locked away for
extensive periods of time. Moreover, pedophiles are viewed as heinous
and vicious precisely because they actively prey on and derive sexual
pleasure from children. It is for these reasons that statutory rape and
child rape statutes carry such severe penalties, and rightly so.
What happens, though, to the person who engages in sexual
relations with a child only because he mistakenly believes his partner

1.
This was adopted from a similar hypothetical used by Professors LaFave and Scott in
analogizing the mistake of fact tenets to the Anglo-American criminal jurisprudential
requirement of convicting only those defendants who had a culpable mental state for the bad act
committed. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6(a), at 282-83 (4th ed. 2003).
2.
See infra notes 162-168 and accompanying text.
3.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (internal quotations omitted).
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to be of age? Suppose, for instance, that a graduate student meets a
girl at a college party. The girl enters the party with a group of
friends, and seems comfortable in her surroundings; she even rebuffs
some prospective suitors who attempt to dance with her and pour her
a drink. The graduate student strikes up a conversation with this girl,
and she tells him that she is a nineteen-year-old sophomore. Her
physical appearance, dress, demeanor, and presence at such an event
seem to confirm her representations. Shortly thereafter, the two
engage in sexual intercourse. It is only then that the girl reveals that
she is just shy of her thirteenth birthday. Under the law applicable in
all but a very few jurisdictions, this graduate student would face a jail
sentence of twenty years and would be unable to proffer any evidence
of his mistake of the girl's age.
While there is little dispute that the situation just described is
implausible, it is not impossible. In fact, recent studies have shown
that the onset of puberty occurs at an increasingly early age in girls
and, according to an article published by the American Academy of
Pediatrics, it is not abnormal for girls to enter puberty as early as age
six or seven. 4 The fact that a remote possibility is just that-a
possibility-begs the question: is it unconstitutional for states to
preclude a mistake of age defense in child rape cases?
This Note answers this question in the affirmative. Indeed, its
goal is to show that statutory preclusion of the mistake of age defense
for a man accused of child rape is just as unconstitutional as the
hypothetical preclusion of the mistake of fact defense for the errant
coat thief. Although sexual intercourse with a child creates much
more harm to both the victim and society than does a stolen coat, this
Note attempts to demonstrate that disregard of an accused's criminal
intent in committing a crime which carries severe penalties is
antithetical to Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, to a person's
constitutional rights of due process, and to a person's constitutional
right to present a defense.
The scope of this Note's proposal is extremely limited. It offers
an accused the ability to present evidence of an honest and reasonable
mistake of age, but also maintains a presumption of criminal intent.
This presumption could only be overcome by persuasive evidence of
the mistake. The policy reasons for precluding the defense, rooted
largely in moral grounds and notions of child welfare, are in no way
undermined by allowing an accused to present his defense and then
leaving the credibility and reasonableness of such a mistake to the
jury. This Note's goal is not to discount the irreparable harm inflicted
4.

See infra notes 209-212 and accompanying text.
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upon victim and society when a child is sexually violated, but rather to
advance the notion that the denial of a person's liberty for committing
an act for which he is mentally blameless is just as repugnant as the
act for which he is condemned. 5
After providing an overview of the terminology involved, Part
II of this Note will trace the history of the common law rule of
imposing criminal liability only upon a showing that the defendant
acted with a culpable "guilty mind." It will then discuss the rationales
for the three narrow exceptions to this requirement and analyze the
implications and influence of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code and the California Supreme Court's landmark decision of
6
People v. Hernandez.
After arguing that the Constitution requires that an accused
can be convicted only upon a showing of the concurrence of the actus
reus with a requisite mens rea for every element of an offense, Part III
will discuss the current availability of the mistake of age defense in
child rape prosecutions across American jurisdictions. While a
majority of jurisdictions allow the defense in some situations, only a
handful of jurisdictions allow it in all child rape cases. Part III will
then critique the rationales for strict liability crimes as applied to
child rape offenses. It will then discuss and assess the validity of
several proposed age-dependent defenses, 7 ultimately concluding that
such bifurcated defenses are inconsistent with arguments against
strict criminal liability. Lastly, as a transition into this Note's
proposal, Part III will analyze the Alaska Supreme Court's decisions
of State v. Guest8 and State v. Fremgen,9 which held that denial of the
mistake of age defense is an unconstitutional violation of a defendant's
due process rights.
Part IV provides a set of proposed amendments to current rape
of a child and mistake of fact statutes. These amendments call for (1)
attaching negligence to the age element of the rape of a child statute;
(2) allowing an honest and reasonable mistake of age defense, but
requiring it be proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3)
5. Although a likely instinctive response to this comment is disbelief and disagreement,
because pedophiliac child sex offenders deserve perhaps even more punishment that the law can
allow, the reader is urged to read this Note in a vacuum-detached from preconceptions of
perpetrators of child sex crimes, and instead with the understanding that it addresses the larger
issue of denials of a person's liberty for engaging in what he honestly and reasonably believed
was lawful activity.
6.
393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
7.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (1980); see also Larry W. Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age:
A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MICH. L. REV. 105 (1965).
8.
583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
9.
914 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1996).
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allowing, as a mitigating factor, a mistake of age defense where the
accused believed he was committing statutory rape. Part IV will
attempt to show that this proposal eliminates the inconsistency of
bifurcated age-dependent models and ensures a criminal defendant's
due process rights without forsaking the policy of protecting children
from sexual predators.
Since Tennessee has adopted a derivation of the Model Penal
Code's age-dependent approach, which is the most common statutory
scheme today, the Tennessee mistake of age provision will be used as
an example throughout this Note. 10 Although portions of this Note
will deal with Tennessee-specific statutes and case law, the
underlying policies are by no means limited to that state. Indeed, the
goal of this Note is to demonstrate that the mistake of age defense is
needed not only to protect an accused's constitutional rights, but also
to preserve our Anglo-American criminal jurisprudential ethos that
crime is a "compound concept" of a bad act and a "vicious will."'1
II. OF CRIME AND "VICIOUS WILLS"-A PRIMER ON STRICT LIABILITY
AND CHILD RAPE

A. PreliminaryMatters-The Dilemma in Context
It is a fundamental tenet of criminal law that a person is guilty
of a crime only if he commits the bad criminal act (actus reus) with a
corresponding mental culpability (mens rea). A corollary that follows
is that a person cannot be guilty of a crime if he acted under an honest
and reasonable mistake of some material fact and he would not have
12
been committing a crime if the facts were as he believed them to be.
In other words, an accused can use as an affirmative defense the fact
that he acted under a mistake of fact that exculpates him from
liability. Tennessee has codified this mistake of fact defense, which
initially applied to all crimes.1 3 In 1995, however, the legislature
amended the mistake of fact statute to allow a defendant to plead his
or her ignorance or mistake as a defense to prosecution "except in
10. Although Tennessee has the statutory distinction between "Rape of a Child" and
"Statutory Rape," this Note will use the term "child rape" to mean any criminal act of intercourse
with a minor.
11. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (internal quotations omitted).
12. As Professors LaFave and Scott have observed: "Instead of speaking of ignorance or
mistake of fact ...as a defense, it would be just as easy to note simply that the defendant cannot
be convicted when it is shown that he does not have the mental state required by law for the
commission of that particular offense." LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 5.6(a), at 282.
13.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-502 (2003).
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prosecutions for" rape of a child. 14 The "rape of a child" offense is
defined as "the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the
defendant ... if such victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age,"
and carries a mandatory twenty year prison sentence. 15 An accused
who engages in sexual relations with a child under thirteen years of
age, therefore, would be unable to assert as a defense an honest and
reasonable mistake of his partner's age. However, if the victim is
thirteen years of age, the accused will be entitled to assert the mistake
of age defense and, even if the mistake of age defense is ineffective,
16
could serve less than three months in prison.
Although at first blush denying a mistake of fact defense seems
antithetical to our criminal philosophical framework, Tennessee's
statute is not unique. In fact, Tennessee is among the majority of
jurisdictions that treat such offenses as strict liability crimes, meaning
that the commission of the criminal act alone, regardless of criminal
intent, is sufficient for conviction.' 7

14. Id., amended by 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts 495, § 1.
15. § 39-13-522. Rape of a Child is a Class A felony, which carries, for a first-time-offender,
a sentence of twenty years in prison. Id.; see also § 40-35-112(a)(1) (allocating the sentence range
for a Class A felony between fifteen and twenty-five years in prison); § 40-35-210(c) (creating a
presumptive sentence at twenty years, absent either aggravating or mitigating factors). A
person convicted of Rape of a Child must serve the entirety of his sentence in prison. § 40-35501(i).
16. If a person sexually penetrates a victim who is between the ages of thirteen and
seventeen, and is at least four years older than the victim, then the accused is guilty of statutory
rape. § 39-13-506. A person convicted of such an offense is guilty of a Class E Felony, which
carries, for a first time offender, a prison sentence of one year. Id.; § 40-35-112(a)(5) (allocating
the sentence range for a Class E Felony between one and two years in prison); see also § 40-35210(c) (creating a presumptive sentence at the minimum of the sentence range). If convicted, a
person will serve only 30 percent of his sentence and could receive an additional 25 percent of his
sentence reduced for "good behavior." § 40-35-501(c), (a)(3) (authorizing mandatory parole upon
serving 30 percent of the sentence); § 41-21-236(a)(2) (allowing an inmate to have his sentence
reduced eight days for every month of good behavior). In other words, a person convicted of
statutory rape would serve eighty-one days in prison. Further, the mistake of age defense is
allowed for one accused of statutory rape. § 39-11-502(a).
This disparity in sentences between rape of a child and statutory rape convictions may
indeed raise cruel and unusual punishment issues implicating the Eighth Amendment, but, for
purposes of this Note, it will be presumed that such sentences carry no constitutional infirmities.
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (holding that state law creating a
mandatory life sentence for a possession of a large quantity of cocaine does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, on the grounds that the Eighth Amendment applies only to cruel and
unusual methods of punishment, not the proportionality of the sentence to the offense charged);
see also Richard A. Posner, PragmaticAdjudication, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1, 12 (1996) (arguing
that under Harmelin, "a state can with constitutional impunity sentence a sixteen-year old to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for the sale of one marijuana cigarette").
17. See infra notes 162-168 and accompanying text. See generally Colin Campbell,
Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46
A.L.R.5th 499, 508 (1997) ("The majority rule in the United States is that a defendant's
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B. Strict Liability and Child Rape: HistoricalJustifications
One of the foremost tenets of Anglo-American jurisprudence is
that the commission of a crime requires the concurrence of the bad act,
or actus reus, with a culpable mental state, or mens rea. As
Blackstone noted centuries ago, "as a vicious will without a vicious act
is no civil crime ...an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no
crime at all. So that, to constitute a crime against human laws, there
must be first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent
upon such vicious will."' 8 This section will discuss the common law
justifications for an exception to this fundamental precept in which
the mens rea is assumed by the commission of the actus reus itself.
Such offenses, where a criminal conviction is not predicated on an
actor's intent, are known as strict liability offenses.
1. Supreme Court Strict Liability Doctrine-The Public Welfare
Offense
The notion that "[c]rime, as a compound concept, [is]
constituted only from [a] concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an
evil-doing hand," has long been recognized by American courts. 19 In
the early twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court began
to assess the constitutionality of statutes that declared certain acts to
be criminal regardless of the actor's mental state. 20 Such statutes
were crafted as "regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called
the police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon
achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of

knowledge of the age of a victim is not an essential element of statutory rape .... A defendant's
good-faith or reasonable belief that the victim is over the age of consent is simply no defense.").
18. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.
19. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952). The Court notes that the
actus reus/mens rea requirement is so inherent in the American jurisprudential landscape that
as states began to codify common law offenses and did not enumerate requisite mental states,
legislatures, through such silences, "merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of
the offense that it required no statutory affirmation." Id. at 252.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (reversing the defendant's
acquittal by the lower court under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for mislabeling
pharmaceuticals, despite the defendant's lack of knowledge of the false labels); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (upholding an indictment under a provision of the Narcotic Act,
which made criminal the unauthorized sale of opium, despite the defendant's demurrer on the
grounds that he did not know the substance he sold was indeed opium). In Balint, the Court
noted that although a culpable mens rea or "scienter" is required for a criminal conviction, "there
has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of
which would be obstructed by such a requirement," whereby legislatures may "in the
maintenance of a public policy" remove the necessity of proving a mental culpability. Id. at 252.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2:693

the crimes as in cases of mala in se." 2' As more of these statutes were

promulgated, the Court began to find that if Congress did not
enumerate a requisite mental state, no mens rea was required for
conviction. 22 It was not until Morissette v. United States,23 however,
that the Court decided to resolve the developing dissonance between
the common law mens rea requirement and the burgeoning class of
strict liability statutory offenses.
In Morissette, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of
a scrap iron collector who removed spent bomb casings from a
seemingly abandoned army base in Michigan. 24 It was presumed
throughout the community that this base was abandoned; the land
was primarily thought of as "good deer country." 25 While on a deer
hunting expedition, the petitioner collected some three tons of spent
bomb casings from the land "without the slightest effort at
concealment," netting a profit of $84.26 The statute under which he
was convicted did not enumerate a requisite mens rea. 27 However,
21. Balint, 258 U.S. at 252. The Court in Balint further explained that "where one deals
with others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or
poison, the policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of
the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells." Id. at 25253. Similarly, in Dotterweich, the Court reversed acquittal even though the defendant was the
president of a pharmaceutical sales company and had no part in the (mis)labeling of the drugs.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278, 285. The Court did so on the grounds that legislation such as the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a "familiar" type of legislation "whereby penalties serve
as effective means of regulation.... In the interest of the larger good [such statutes] put[ ] the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation
to a public danger." Id. at 280-81.
22. In both Dotterweich and Balint, the statutes at issue did not enumerate a mens rea, and
the Court in each case held that no mention of a mental state meant that Congress intended
such offenses to be strict liability. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285; Balint, 258 U.S. at 254. In
Dotterweich, the Court warned that "[h]ardship there doubtless may be under a statute which
thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting." 320 U.S.
at 284. Justice Murphy dissented on the grounds that strict liability crimes should exist only if
the legislature explicitly intended to do so: "It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence that guilt is personal and that it ought not lightly to be imputed to a citizen
who ... has no evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing.... Before we place the stigma of
a criminal conviction upon any such citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and
unambiguous." Id. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
23. 342 U.S. 246.
24. Id. at 247.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 247-48.
27. Id. at 250. The Act under which the petitioner was convicted provides in part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowing converts to his use or the use of
another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any.., thing of value of
the United States ... [sihall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of
$100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both.
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despite his ignorance of both the active status of the base and the
criminality of his actions, Morissette was indicted and convicted of
converting government property, for which he was sentenced to
imprisonment for two months or to pay a fine of $200.28
The Court, led by Justice Jackson, overturned the conviction on
the ground that there must be a concurrence of an actus reus and a
mens rea. Invoking Blackstone's "vicious will" tenet, Justice Jackson
noted that the contention that an actus reus can amount to a crime
only if accompanied by a concurrent mens rea "is no provincial or
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability
and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." 29
He explained that the relationship between a culpable intent and
punishment for a harmful act, which has roots in Biblical, Greek, and
Roman law, "is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar
exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to,' and has afforded the rational basis
for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation
in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution." 30 This precept, according to Jackson, has endured with
"unqualified acceptance" in Anglo-American law. 3 1
Notwithstanding the fundamental necessity of a vicious will for
a criminal conviction, the Court explained that certain statutes may
effectively eliminate the requirement of a culpable mental state. 32
Such statutes, like those at issue in United States v. Balint 3 and
United States v. Dotterweich,34 "consist only of forbidden acts or
omissions" and create "new duties and crimes which disregard any
ingredient of intent." 35 Indeed, the Court found that Balint and
Dotterweich represented stages in a century-long development of what
the Court referred to as "public welfare offenses." 36 These offenses are
Id. at 248 n.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000)). It is interesting to note that, although the
threshold values have changed, the statute in its current form is nearly identical. § 641.
28. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248.
29. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 250-51 & n.4.
31. Id. at 251.
32. Id. at 252-54.
33. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
34. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
35. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253.
36. Id. at 255. For a survey of the development of such "public welfare offenses," see
generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62-67 (1933).
Professor Sayre catalogued public welfare offenses into the following categories: (1) illegal sales
of intoxicating liquor; (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs; (3) sales of misbranded
articles; (4) violations of anti-narcotic acts; (5) criminal nuisances; (6) violations of traffic
regulations; (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws; and (8) violations of general police regulations,
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not common law offenses "such as those against the state, the person,
property, or public morals." 37 Instead, they were promulgated in
response to the Industrial Revolution and the accompanying growth in
technology, employment, congestion, and consumerism. 3 The Court
explained the characteristics of public welfare offenses as violations of
law that (1) result from omissions of duties or other impositions of
care; (2) cause no direct or immediate injury; (3) impair the public
health, safety, and welfare, generally on a societal level; and (4) yield
39
small penalties and little stigmatization for a conviction.
The petitioner in Morissette was convicted of larceny, a crime
which existed at common law. 40 Larceny cannot be seen as either
neglect or omission of a duty, does not impair the health, safety, and
welfare of society at large, and carries, inter alia, a potential ten-year
prison sentence. 41 The Court held, therefore, that an implied mens
rea requirement should be read into the statute, reasoning that
"[s]uch a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual
42
should not be extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative."
Since a conviction now required a finding of the implied requisite
mens rea and it was beyond dispute that the petitioner had no
intention to steal government property, the Court reversed his
conviction. 43 The Court recognized, however, that Congress had a
limited power to dispense with the intent requirement if it did so
specifically. 44

passed for safety, health, or well-being of the community. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 262 n.20 (citing
Sayre, supra, at 73, 84).
37. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255.
38. Id. at 253-54.
39. Id. at 255-56. Dean Richard Singer has listed several bases for public welfare offenses:
(1) deterring profit-driven manufacturers from ignoring the well-being of the consuming public;
(2) an inquiry into intent for such offenses would exhaust courts' resources; (3) since the
penalties are small and the social stigma is minimal or nonexistent, the imposition of strict
liability is not inconsistent with the "moral underpinnings of criminal law"; and (4) the
legislature is constitutionally empowered to create strict liability crimes for public welfare
offenses. Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III-The Rise and Fall of Strict
CriminalLiability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 389 (1989).
40. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260-62.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 263.
43. Id. at 274-76. The Court also held that a judge cannot remove the question of intent
from the hands of the fact-finder. Id. at 274. For this proposition, the Court cited approvingly a
quote from Judge Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals: "It is alike the general rule of law
and the dictate of natural justice that to constitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act,
but a criminal intention. Under our system... both must be found by the jury to justify a
conviction for crime." Id. at 274 (quoting People v. Flack, 26 N.E. 267, 270 (N.Y. 1891)).
44. Id. at 275 (citing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943)).
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The principal value of Morissette, therefore, is its recognition of
the public welfare offense as a modern exception to the AngloAmerican requirement of a culpable mens rea for every criminal actus
reus. This exception applies to offenses that are "new crimes, created
solely by legislative enactments in the nature of police regulations.
Moreover, these offenses are not strictly criminal, even though
traditional criminal sanctions are relied upon, since the primary
purpose of the legislature is neither punishment nor correction, but
rather regulation." 45
2. Common Law Strict Liability-Lesser Legal Wrong and Moral
Wrong
Public welfare offenses are not the only offenses subject to
strict liability. In dicta, the Morissette Court noted that although
Blackstone's vicious will requirement received "[u]nqualified
acceptance" by "[c]ommon law commentators of the Nineteenth
Century... a few exceptions... came to be recognized." 46 The Court
commented that historically, a certain class of common law offenses
has not required the existence of mental culpability. 47
These
exceptions "include sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's
actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief
that the girl had reached age of consent." 48 Offenses of this nature
also include bigamy, adultery, abduction of minor females from their
parents or guardians, prostituting a minor female, and contributing to
the delinquency of a minor. 49 The common law justifications for
holding an accused criminally liable for these offenses without a
culpable mens rea have rested on two theories: the lesser legal wrong
and the moral wrong.
The lesser legal wrong theory predicates conviction for an actus
reus on an intent to commit any type of criminal act; the elimination
of a mens rea is rationalized by focusing on the defendant's intent to
commit a related crime.5 0 The moral wrong theory posits that strict
criminal liability can be justified on the basis that society's
characterization of the act at issue is so immoral or wrong that it
45. Myers, supra note 7, at 114.
46. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251
47. Id. at 251 & n.8. Since these exceptions were "not relevant to [the] present problem,"
the Court did not address the continuing vitality and constitutionality of these common law
exceptions. Id.
48. Id. While the Court gave several other examples of such traditional strict liability, child
rape is the only offense pertinent to this Note.
49. Myers, supra note 7, at 115.
50. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 5.6(a), at 287-89.

704

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2:693

outrages public decency and good morals. 51 Under this theory, "acts
which allegedly involve moral turpitude are revolting to the better
instincts of the community and are universally recognized to be a
'
serious wrong not only to the individual, but also to society."52
The seminal case advancing the lesser legal wrong and moral
wrong theories is Regina v. Prince.53 In Prince, the defendant was
convicted of unlawfully taking a girl under the age of sixteen from her
father's possession against the father's will. 54 The defendant admitted
to taking the girl, but insisted that he did so with the belief that she
was over sixteen. 55 The taking of a girl under twenty-one without the
father's consent was criminal as well, so the defendant would still
have been committing a crime (albeit a lesser one) even if the facts
were as he believed them to be.5 6 In addition to this lesser legal wrong
justification for affirming the conviction, the court advanced a moral
wrong justification, stating that "[t]he act forbidden is wrong in itself,
if without lawful cause; I do not say illegal, but wrong." 57
Although the issue in Prince is prima facie similar to issues
presented by child rape offenses, it must be noted that there are
conflicting accounts of the historical roots of the proscription of a
mistake of age defense in prosecutions for child rape. 58 Nevertheless,
and notwithstanding the statutory abrogation of the crime at issue in
Prince, American courts have widely accepted the Prince lesser legal
wrong/moral wrong construct since the end of the nineteenth
century. 59 In the child rape context, the principal "lesser legal
wrongs" warranting the more severe convictions have been the crimes
of fornication and adultery. 60 Such crimes, however, are generally no
51. Myers, supra note 7, at 128.
52. Id.
53. 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 154 (1875).
54. Id. Apparently, it was a crime to take a girl under sixteen from her father's home
regardless of consent. Id. at 154 n.1.
55. Id. at 157.
56. Id. at 155-56.
57. Id. at 174 (Bramwell, J., concurring), cited in Vicki J. Bejma, Note, Protective Cruelty:
State v. Yanez and Strict Liability as to Age in Statutory Rape, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
499, 516 (2000).
58. See Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 49 (Md. 1999) (comparing United States v. Brooks, 841
F.2d 268, 270 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[Statutory rape was universally regarded as a strict liability
offense until well into the twentieth century.") with Myers, supra note 7, at 109-10 (finding that
reasonable mistake of age has never been denied as a defense in an English statutory rape
case)).
59. Myers, supra note 7, at 111.
60. See id. at 127 ("[Ihf in some general way the actor had a guilty mind as to his conduct,
such as knowledge that he was committing an act of fornication, it is assumed that he had a
criminal intent to justify his conviction of an unintended criminal act ... because the mistake
went to the degree of wrong rather than to the presence of the wrong."); Benjamin L. Reiss,
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longer present as statutory offenses. 61 Advocates of the moral wrong
theory cite the taboo and immorality of engaging in sexual relations
62
with children, as well as society's condemnation of that act.
The lesser legal wrong and moral wrong justifications for
making child rape a strict liability offense have been attacked on
many fronts. Principal among the criticisms of the lesser legal wrong
theory is that the lesser legal wrongs which previously "justified" a
conviction of child rape, namely fornication and adultery, have been
abolished, abrogated, or are simply not enforced. 63 Critics also attack
the moral wrong theory, citing the impropriety of government
legislating morality, the shifting and different conceptions of
"morality" within and among societies, and the notion that a person's
morality or immorality is determined by his or her intentions. 64 A

Alaska's Mens Rea Requirements for Statutory Rape, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 377, 381-82 (1992) ("[I]f
fornication is a crime and the defendant has the required mens rea for fornication ... that intent
applies to all the legal consequences of the act of fornication. Naturally, if the other participant
in the sexual act is younger than the statutory age, a charge of statutory rape ... would be such
a consequence."); see also Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 812 n.10 (Md. 1993) (Bell, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that if the defendant, who engaged in sexual relations with a girl
under the age of consent, were married, his conviction of statutory rape could be upheld on lesser
legal wrong grounds because adultery is a crime in Maryland).
61. Fornication is still illegal in only eight states and adultery illegal in nine. See infra
notes 178-179 and accompanying text. The impropriety of the use of the lesser legal wrong
theory will be discussed in more detail. See infra Part III.C.2.
62. See, e.g., People v. Ratz, 46 P. 915, 916 (Cal. 1896) (relying on Prince in prohibiting a
defendant from asserting a mistake of age defense in a statutory rape prosecution because
"protection of the society, of the family, and of the infant, demand that one who has carnal
intercourse under such circumstances shall do so in peril"). It has been argued that Ratz is the
first case in any jurisdiction to hold directly that immorality alone is enough for conviction.
Myers, supra note 7, at 128 n.141.
63. See infra notes 178-184 and accompanying text; see also LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 5.6(c),
at 288 ("[W]hen fornication is itself not criminal [statutory rape] should not become criminal
merely because the defendant has made a reasonable mistake about the age of the girl with
whom he has intercourse."); Myers, supra note 7, at 127.28 ("[T]he foundation of this 'lesser legal
wrong' theory in statutory rape cases is totally wiped out where fornication is no longer
criminal."); Reiss, supra note 60, at 382 (reasoning that a defendant should not be held strictly
liable for statutory rape if premarital or extramarital sex is not a criminal offense).
64. Indeed, the Supreme Court may have rejected the proposition that morality alone is a
rational basis for a law that otherwise infringes upon one's constitutional rights. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) ("[Tlhe majority may [not] use the power of the
State to enforce [its] views [of morality] on the whole society through operation of the criminal
law."); id. at 2483 ('[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice .. .- (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)));
see also id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision "effectively decrees
the end of all morals legislation" because it "asserts [that] the promotion of majoritarian sexual
morality is not even a legitimate state interest"); Garnett, 632 A.2d at 813-14 (Bell, J., dissenting)
(enumerating the many objections to the moral wrong theory).
For a pithy aphorismic
illustration of the connection between morality and intent, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
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more in-depth analysis of the lesser legal wrong and moral wrong
theories will be offered later in this Note.
C. Return of the "Vicious Will"--The Model Penal Code and People v.
Hernandez
Despite Supreme Court precedent and academic criticisms that
attacked the underpinnings of strict criminal liability for child rape
crimes, a mistake of age defense did not first appear until the 1960s.
As one court noted at the turn of the twentieth century, "[i]nvariably,
in [prosecutions for child rape,] it has been held that whoever
committed the offense did it at his peril so far as the girl's age was
concerned, and that ignorance or mistake in respect to her age would
constitute no defense." 65 In the latter half of the twentieth century,
however, two reforms--one academic and one judicial-began an
apparent shift toward requiring a culpable mens rea for a conviction of
child rape offenses. The first was the drafting (and subsequent
influence) of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (M.P.C.
or the Code), and the second was the California Supreme Court's
66
decision in People v. Hernandez.
The American Law Institute promulgated the Model Penal
Code in 1962 in an effort to "put the house of penal jurisprudence into
some kind of rational order." 67 Among the most striking features of
the Model Penal Code's philosophical framework is its systematic and
discrete method for defining and determining the mental element of a
crime and how it should attach to the various elements of a given
offense. 68 Briefly stated, the Code requires that an enumerated
mental state must be required to prove any material element-defined
as the conduct, its attendant circumstances, and its results-of the
offense for which an accused is charged. 69 Strict liability offenses
under the Code embrace the Morissette public welfare construct. In
the absence of a contrary statute, such offenses are not crimes but
"violations" which carry only civil penalties such as a fine or
forfeiture. 70 In other words, "[a] violation does not constitute a crime
COMMON LAW 3 (Little, Brown & Co. 1946) (1923) ("Even a dog distinguishes being stumbled
over and being kicked.").
65. Brown v. State, 74 A. 836, 838 (Del. 1909), cited in Myers, supra note 7, at 115-16.
66. 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1964).
67. Charles McClain & Dan M. Kahan, Criminal Law Reform: Historical Development in
the United States, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 412, 423 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d. ed.
2002).
68. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1985).
69. §§ 1.13(9), 2.02(1).
70. §§ 2.05(1), 1.04(5).
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and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or
legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense." 71
Otherwise, a conviction is predicated on a jury finding that the
accused acted, depending on the statutory requirements, purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to each material
element. 72 If no such mental state is enumerated in the statute,
however, a jury must find that the accused acted at least recklessly for
each element. 73 It follows, therefore, that except for strict liability
"violations," it is a defense if an accused's honest and reasonable
ignorance or mistake of fact "negatives the purpose, knowledge,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element." 74
In child rape offenses, the Code offers a separate mistake of age
provision, section 213.6(1), which limits the use of a pure mistake of
fact defense in such prosecutions. 75 The Code provides:
Whenever in [an enumerated sexual offense] the criminality of conduct depends on a
child's being below the age of 10, it is no defense that the actor did not know the child's
age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than 10. When criminality depends on
the child's being below a critical age other than 10, it is a defense for the actor to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed the child to be above the
76
critical age.

The drafters of the Code eliminated the honest and reasonable
mistake of age defense for offenses against children under ten years
old in an effort to resolve the conflict between its "mental state for
every element" philosophical construct and the reality that sexual
activities with minors are perceived as a moral wrong. 77 The drafters
compromised by prohibiting the mistake defense below the age of ten;
71. § 1.04(5).
72. § 2.02 (1)-(4). A person acts "purposely" with respect to an element of an offense if the
conduct or result elements are the result of his or her conscious object, and he is aware of the
attendant circumstances or hopes they exist; he acts "knowingly" with respect to all elements if
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances and is practically certain
such conduct and circumstances will cause such a result; he acts "recklessly" with respect to a
material element if he "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct," and that risk is of such a nature and
degree that its disregard is "gross deviation from the standard of conduct" that a reasonable,
law-abiding person would observe; and s/he acts "negligently" when s/he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk, and his or her failure to perceive such a risk is a gross
deviation from the conduct of a reasonable person. § 2.02(2)(a)-(d).
73. § 2.02(3).
74. § 2.04(1)(a). It is also important to note that the Code embraces a somewhat modified
lesser legal wrong theory, providing that "the defense [of mistake of fact] is not available if the
defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed." § 2.04(2).
In such a case, an accused can only be convicted of the offense for which he would have been
found guilty if the facts were as he supposed. Id.
75. § 213.6(1).
76. Id.
77. § 213.6(1) cmt. 2.
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they opined that strict liability for offenses committed against children
so young is acceptable because "no credible error regarding the age of
a child in fact less than 10 years old would render the actor's conduct
anything less than a dramatic departure from societal norms."78
Further, "[t]he actor who is mistaken as to the age of a child under ten
can make no such claim [of mistake of age], for no credible error of
perception would be sufficient to recharacterize a child of such tender
years as an appropriate subject of sexual gratification." 79 For children
over ten years of age, section 213.6 differs from the general mistake of
fact statute in important ways. First, the phrase "reasonably believes"
allows the defense only for a mistake that is both honest and
reasonable.8 0 Second, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the
defendant, eliminating the need for the prosecution to disprove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the actor was mistaken about his partner's
81
age.
The M.P.C.'s mistake of age provision, with its bifurcation of
82
the common law rule along age lines, was highly influential.
However, the drafters expressed some misgivings about the tiered,
age-dependent approach, recognizing that the provision tempers and
indeed conflicts with the intended goal of a philosophically consistent
penal code. Acknowledging that any actor who has an honest and
reasonable mistake of any material fact "has [a] substantial claim for
exculpation," they further asserted that "[p]unishing him anyway
simply because his intended conduct would have been immoral under
the facts as he supposed them to be postulates a relation between
criminality and immorality that is inaccurate on both descriptive and
normative grounds."8' 3 Despite their conclusion that "[t]he penal law
does not try to enforce all aspects of community morality, and any
thoroughgoing attempt to do so would extend the prospect of criminal
sanctions far into the sphere of individual liberty and create a regime
too demanding for all save the best among us," the drafters abandoned
their theoretical rubric for offenses against children under ten because
of social mores and the unlikelihood of an honest and reasonable
84
mistake with such young children.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. According to the drafters, at least twenty-five jurisdictions have adopted or proposed
some form of culpability requirement in child rape offenses. Most commonly, these states allow
the defense for higher ages but retain strict liability for the young age defining the most serious
version of the offense. § 213.6(1) cmt. 2 & nn. 10-11, 13-15.
83. § 213.6(1) cmt. 2.
84. Id.
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The Model Penal Code's treatment of strict liability and
mistake of age, despite its apparent compromise with society's moral
mandates, was revolutionary in that it demonstrated, at least on an
academic level, that a mistake of age defense furthers the goals of and
philosophies behind Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. Two
years after the promulgation of the Code, this "revolution" filtered
from academia into practicality. In 1964, in what one scholar has
called a "dramatic breakthrough in the judicial treatment of statutory
rape," the California Supreme Court became the first American court
to require the availability of a mistake of age defense in child rape
prosecutions.8 5 The defendant in People v. Hernandez was convicted of
engaging in sexual relations with his girlfriend who, at the time, was
three months shy of the statutory age of consent.8 6 The defendant
appealed on the grounds that he had an honest and reasonable belief
that his paramour was above the critical age.8 7
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Peek held that absent
an explicit statute to the contrary, an accused cannot be criminally
liable for an offense that he did not have the criminal intent to
commit.8 8 The court found that the traditional justifications for
prohibiting the mistake of age defense in child rape prosecutionsprotecting the integrity of society and young, generally female,
children-are no longer valid on two grounds.
First, the court
reasoned that basing criminal liability on blanket assumptions
regarding a certain-aged child's understanding of and ability to
appreciate and emotionally deal with sexual mores is arbitrary.8 9
Second, the court suggested that the societal goals of protecting child
victims and the sanctity of the community would not be hindered by
allowing a defendant to present evidence of an honest and reasonable
mistake of age, suggesting that the traditional approach has never
been "satisfactorily explain[ed]" by courts who adhere to it.90
The court rationalized its decision by analogizing statutory
rape to bigamy, another crime of "moral turpitude." 91 It relied on an
85. Myers, supranote 7, at 107-08.
86. 393 P.2d 673, 673-74 (Cal. 1964).
87. Id. at 674.
88. Id. at 677.
89. Id. at 674 ('The sexually experienced [child] may be far more acutely aware of the
implications of sexual intercourse than her sheltered [adult] cousin.... A girl who belongs to a
group whose members indulge in sexual intercourse.., is likely to rapidly acquire an insight
into the rewards and penalties of sexual indulgence.").
90. See id. at 676-77 ("[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the purposes of the
law as stated in [the majority approach to child rape offenses] can be better served by foreclosing
the defense of a lack of intent.").
91. Id. at 676-77.
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earlier decision holding that a person who remarries with an honest
and reasonable yet mistaken belief that she has obtained a divorce
from her prior spouse cannot be held criminally liable under bigamy
laws. 92 The former decision held that "[t]he severe penalty imposed
for bigamy, the serious loss of reputation conviction entails, and the
fact that it has been regarded for centuries as a crime involving moral
turpitude, make it extremely unlikely that the Legislature meant to
'93
include the morally innocent to make sure the guilty did not escape.
As a result, the Hernandez court questioned the criminality of a
94
person operating under a mistake of age in the context of child rape.
An accused, according to the court, who operates with an
honest and reasonable mistake has not committed an immoral act, for
he "has subjectively eliminated the risk by satisfying himself on
reasonable evidence that the crime cannot be committed. If it occurs
that he has been misled, we cannot realistically conclude that for such
reason alone the intent with which he undertook the act suddenly
becomes more heinous." 95 The court conceded that it is "sound
policy.., to protect the sexually naive female from exploitation," and
therefore held that the legislature could statutorily prohibit the
mistake of age defense. 96 In the absence of a contrary statute,
however, the court held that "a charge of statutory rape is defensible
97
wherein a criminal intent is lacking."
The Model Penal Code and Hernandez suggest an ideological
and jurisprudential shift in the required mental culpability in child
sex offenses. Indeed, Hernandez has been hailed as a "dramatic
breakthrough" in the judicial treatment of the mistake of age
defense. 98 However, the court in Hernandez, like the American Law
Institute, seems to temper its position, this time by deferring to the
legislature. 99

92. Id. at 677 (citing People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal. 1956)).
93. Id. (citing Vogel, 299 P.2d at 855).
94. Id. at 676 ("[C]riminal intent exists when the perpetrator proceeds with.., the lack of
grounds for[ ] a belief that the female has reached the age of consent. But if he participates in a
mutual act of sexual intercourse, believing his partner to be beyond the age of consent, with
reasonable grounds for such belief, where is his criminal intent?").
95. Id.
96. Id. at 677.
97. Id.
98. Myers, supra note 7, at 107.
99. Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 677.
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III. DISCUSSION: THE 'REVOLUTION' WILL NOT BE RECOGNIZED
The notion that a criminal defendant is subject to criminal
liability only upon proof that he committed an offense with a culpable
intent to do so is fundamental to the Anglo-American penal justice
system. 0 0 From Morissette and its progeny two exceptions emerge: (1)
public welfare regulatory offenses, and (2) traditionally accepted strict
liability in sex offenses where the victim's age was determinative.' 10
In Morissette, the Court, however, made no judgment as to the validity
of this latter exception-it merely listed it in a footnote as an
exception that "came to be recognized.' ' 0 2 Most jurisdictions, however,
have adopted this exception and have either judicially or statutorily
03
proscribed the mistake of age defense in child rape cases.
This Part will discuss the current state rules regarding the
mistake of age defense and critique the justifications for precluding it.
It will also discuss the Alaskan extension of Hernandez. As a
threshold matter, however, it is necessary to ascertain whether there
is indeed a constitutional right to present a defense.
A. Can States Eliminate Mens Rea Requirements? Egelhoff and the
ConstitutionalRight To Present a Defense
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be
10 4
deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"
and the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the rights
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."'1 5 "Taken together, these
rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury
determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.' " 106 The Supreme

100. See supra Part II.B.1.
101. See supra note 36-39, 48 and accompanying text.
102. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 & n.8 (1952).
103. Campbell, supra note 17; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2000) (allowing for a defense of
engaging in a sexual act with another person between the ages of twelve and fifteen if the
defendant can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed that the
person was sixteen).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
106. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 510 (1995)); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[The Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
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Court has held that through these provisions, "the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present
a complete defense.' "107 The Court, however, has been inconsistent in
deciding whether this "meaningful opportunity" creates a
constitutional mandate of a mens rea requirement.1 0 8
In addition to acknowledging the fundamentality of the
Blackstonian "vicious will" requirement, 10 9 the Supreme Court has
held that the right to present a defense is fundamental. The right
gives an accused the opportunity "to offer the testimony of witnesses,
and to compel their attendance ... [which] is in plain terms the right
to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the
facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury." 110 Indeed, as far as this
relates to mens rea, the Court has been clear that "intent generally
remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense," and that
Morissette should be read as "establishing, at least with regard to
crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretative
presumption that mens rea is required.""' According to the Court,
"[t]he right of accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence,
the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations."' 2 This right to present a defense, in appropriate
situations, trumps state rules of evidence governing topics such as
hearsay," 3 permissible class of witnesses, 1 4 and admissible prior
testimony." 5 In other words, "an essential component of procedural
fairness is an opportunity to be heard. That opportunity would be an
empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable
evidence."" 6 Based on such Supreme Court precedent, it would seem
that this fundamental right to present such competent and reliable

107. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 485 (1984)).

108. For a thoughtful article on mens rea in Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Herbert L.
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107 ("Mens rea is an
important requirement, but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.").
109. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
110. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19
(1967)).
111. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978).
112. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
113. Id. (holding right to present a defense trumps state rules requiring "voucher" of a
hearsay statement).
114. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 (holding unconstitutional a state's preclusion of convicted
coparticipants as defense witnesses).
115. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (holding that a state per se preclusion of a
defendant's recorded statement during a hypnotic session infringes impermissibly on her right to
present a defense).
116. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations omitted).
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evidence includes the imposition of a mental state requirement for
every element of every crime not appropriately considered a public
welfare offense.
The right to present a defense, however, is not absolute. 117 In
Montana v. Egelhoff,"8 the Supreme Court narrowly held that a state
statute prohibiting a defendant from using the defense of voluntary
intoxication in a murder charge did not violate the defendant's due
process rights. 11 9 In this case, the defendant wished to present
evidence of his extreme intoxication to show that he was physically
incapable of shooting two companions despite evidence of gunshot
residue on his hands and that he brought the gun with him several
hours earlier and retrieved it before using it.120 The jury was told to
disregard any evidence of the defendant's drunkenness because a
Montana statute provided that "[a] person who is in an intoxicated
condition is criminally responsible for his conduct and an intoxicated
condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be taken into
consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is
an element of the offense."'121 As noted, however, the defendant did
not attempt to use his intoxication to disprove mental culpability, but
rather that he was physically unable to have committed the crimes.1 22
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds
that the statute denied the defendant's due process right to present a
defense by preventing the jury from considering evidence relevant to
the issue of the defendant's mental culpability. 23
Even though the Montana legislature attempted to preclude
the defendant from claiming that he lacked mental culpability, the
Montana Supreme Court concluded that the federal constitution
required that the defendant be allowed to argue that he had no mental
culpability. If accepted by the United States Supreme Court, the
Montana Supreme Court's conclusion may mean that the federal
constitution demands that a mental state is required for every
element of every crime, regardless of a legislature's attempt to remove
mens rea for certain elements of certain crimes.

117. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) ("The accused does not have an
unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible
under standard rules of evidence.").
118. 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (plurality).
119. Id. at 56.
120. Id. at 40-41, 54.
121. Id. at 41; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995).

122. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 41.
123. Id.
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Justice Scalia, speaking on behalf of himself and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy, reversed the
Montana Supreme Court's decision. 124 Unfortunately, this plurality's
reasoning sheds little light on whether eliminating mens rea is
constitutionally permissible. Rather, it construed Montana's statute
to restrict a defendant's right to introduce evidence, and held that
states are allowed to do so unless such a restriction violates a
Looking toward historical
"fundamental principle of justice."'125
practice in an attempt to discern the fundamentality of a voluntary
intoxication defense, the plurality noted that the common law
regarded a person who committed a crime while intoxicated as doubly
culpable. 26 Although most states recognized voluntary intoxication as
a defense over the last century-plus, the plurality felt that such a
theory, even if held by the majority of jurisdictions "is of too recent
vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent
1 27
allegiance, to qualify as fundamental."'
The plurality acknowledged that "[i]n the absence of any valid
state justification, exclusion of ... exculpatory evidence deprives a
defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter
and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."' 28 The
Court concluded that evidence of the defendant's voluntary
intoxication, however, would be misleading to the jury because there
was no clear evidence as to whether an intoxicated person was able to
form the requisite mens rea. 29 As a result, the plurality held that the
state had a valid justification to forbid "consideration of voluntary
intoxication when a defendant's state of mind is at issue."'3 °
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence provided the decisive "swing
vote." Unlike the plurality, she did not see the statute as evidentiary.
Instead, she saw it as within the constitutional purview of the states'
"wide latitude" to redefine mens rea as they see fit, particularly "when
determining the extent to which moral culpability should be a
prerequisite to conviction of a crime. 1 31 She considered the case as
presenting one "essential" question: "Can a State, without offense to
the Federal Constitution, make the judgment that two people are

124. Id. at 39.
125. Id. at 43 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
126. Id. at 43-47.
127. Id. at 47, 51. The plurality even acknowledges that this "new rule" of intoxication as a
defense to mental culpability has existed since 1819. Id. at 46.
128. Id. at 53 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) (emphasis omitted)).
129. Id. at 50-51.
130. Id. at 56.
131. Id. at 58 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 228, 232 (1987)).
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equally culpable where one commits an act stone sober, and the other
engages in the same conduct after his voluntary intoxication has
reduced his capacity for self-control?"' 132 Like the plurality, Ginsburg
acknowledged that "[w]hen a State's power to define criminal conduct
is challenged under the Due Process Clause, [the Court] inquire[s]
only whether the law 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' "133 Given the common law tradition relied upon by the
plurality and its continued acceptance in a minority of states, Justice
Ginsburg found that the Montana legislature's redefinition of mens
rea "encounter[ed] no constitutional shoal."'134 If read broadly-and
not limited to voluntary intoxication-Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
could stand for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not require a mental state for every element of every crime. As
discussed below, however, it is unlikely that either Justice Ginsburg
intended or the Constitution allows such an expansive reading of the
opinion.
Taken together, Egelhoffs five separate opinions, 135 including a
''majority' resting on different conceptions of the nature of the statute,
are, as Dean Singer and Professor Douglas Husak put it,
"extraordinarily difficult to decipher."'136
At least five justices
implicitly hold that states are free to redefine the mens rea elements
of crimes as they see fit, as the plurality expressed "complete
agreement" with Justice Ginsburg's approach. 137 Does this mean that
132. Id. at 57.
133. Id. at 58 (quoting Patterson,432 U.S. at 202).
134. Id.
135. Justice O'Connor, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, viewed
the Montana law as an evidentiary law, as did the plurality, but found that there was no
legitimate justification for the withholding of evidence of a defendant's drunkenness. Id. at 6971 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Unlike the plurality, O'Connor found the centuries-old availability
of an intoxication defense to be a "fundamental principle." Id. at 71. Although she disagreed
with Justice Ginsburg's reading that the statute is merely a redefinition of culpable mens rea,
she acknowledged that states reserve the right to so define the elements of crimes within their
statutory law. Id. at 71-73. In a separate dissent, Justice Souter agreed with this point, saying
"I have no doubt that a State may so define the mental element of an offense that evidence of a
defendant's voluntary intoxication at the time of commission does not have exculpatory relevance
and, to that extent, may be excluded without raising any issue of due process." Id. at 73 (Souter,
J., dissenting). His dissent, however, rested on his belief that the Court was bound to interpret
the statute as one of evidentiary exclusion, as the Montana Supreme Court had done, and on his
belief, one that he share with Justice O'Connor, that the State did not provide any justification
for excluding this relevant evidence. Id. at 73-74. Finally, Justice Breyer wrote a separate
dissent, joined by Justice Stevens, in which he opined that reading the statute as a redefinition
of the mental state may "produce anomalous results." Id. at 79-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and
Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859, 906 (1999).
137. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 50 n.4.
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Egelhoff stands, at least implicitly, for the proposition that states can
constitutionally abolish mens rea requirements required by
Morissette? In other words, is crime as a compound concept no longer
a "fundamental principle of justice"?
Dean Singer and Professor Husak suggest that Egelhoff should
not be read so expansively. 138 Instead, they read the opinion to apply
only to the voluntary intoxication defense. 39 Such a reading, they
contend, does "not undermine the Court's commitment to protect
innocent persons from criminal liability." 140 Rather, they argue that
Egelhoff is actually consistent with the Court's "compound concept"
jurisprudence.
"[Tihe protection of innocence has formed the
cornerstone of recent Supreme Court decisions," and Egelhoff, in order
to be consistent with such a protection, must apply only to voluntary
intoxication.14 ' Singer and Husak's thesis that Egelhoff does not allow
states to eliminate mental culpability is instructive in analyzing the
current state of the constitutional right to present a defense. 142
Professor Peter Westen, like Singer and Husak, reads Egelhoff
as confined to voluntary intoxication, but his interpretation further
limits its reach to only instances in which crimes are committed
during a state of "intoxication-induced automatism" or "blackout."'1 43
He argues that the rather unique set of facts in the case-in which the
defendant did not argue that his intoxication negated any intent to
commit the two murders, but rather that "his intoxication induced a
fugue state of automatism during which he was wholly unconscious of
what he was doing"-limits the decision's scope.144 Since the statute
only affects the defendant's ability to negate mental culpability by
evidence of not remembering his commission of the crimes, Westen
argues, as did eighteen states in amicus curie briefs to the Court in
Egelhoff, that the Montana statute would not exclude evidence of
voluntary intoxication to prove accident or mistake. 45 Otherwise, the
statute would have the "very constitutionally worrisome effect ...of
denying defendants a right to introduce evidence relevant to elements

138. Singer & Husak, supra note 136, at 909.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 910-11.

142. Id. at 912-43.
143. Peter Westen, Egelhoff Again, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1278 (1999).
144. Id. at 1255, 1276.
145. Id. at 1249. In an amicus brief, eighteen states argued that "[hiad the evidence been
such that Egelhoff had.. . accidentally killed two unknown persons while taking 'target practice'
at some tin cans in the middle of a field, Egelhoff would have been entitled to an acquittal of the
charge of deliberate homicide, even if he were voluntarily drunk." Id.
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that the state was required to prove." 146 Put simply, Westen argues
that the statute requires the prosecution to prove the defendant's
mens rea for each element of the offense as if the defendant was not
intoxicated, and that the Court, particularly Justice Ginsburg, at least
implicitly understood that its holding was confined to "rare cases of
' 147
intoxication-induced automatism."
Principles of federalism and state autonomy indicate that state
legislatures are unquestionably free to create statutes and to define
149
crimes as they see fit.1 48 Such freedom, however, is not unlimited.
Indeed, even the Egelhoff plurality would limit such freedom on due
process grounds if the statute in question "offend[ed] some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental," but instead, the plurality held that the
presentation of evidence of voluntary intoxication is not a
fundamental right, and that there were significant state policies
advanced by the Montana statute.
The plurality based its determination of the fundamentality of
the voluntary intoxication defense on the questionable historical
preclusion of voluntary intoxication as a defense as well as recent
studies showing the fallacy of the "learned belief' of intoxication as an
The view that voluntary
excuse for criminal culpability.' 50
intoxication is a defense to criminal liability is a "new common-law
rule" that cannot, according to the Court, be held as a "fundamental
principle" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 51 Further, the
plurality held that not considering voluntary intoxication as a defense
serves as a deterrent to criminal activity on three levels: (1) it deters
generally "irresponsible behavior while drunk"; (2) it serves as a
specific deterrent by "ensuring that those who prove incapable of
controlling violent impulses while voluntarily intoxicated go to
prison"; and (3) "it comports with and implements society's moral
perception that one who voluntarily impaired his own faculties be
152
responsible for the consequences."'
146. Id. at 1258.
147. Id. at 1278.
148. See generally New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
149. The next sentence in Brandeis's famous dissent is as follows: "This Court has the power
to prevent an experiment .... We have the power to do this, because the due process clause [is]
applicable to matters of substantive law .. " Id.
150. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43-51 (1996).
151. Id. at 48.
152. Id. at 49-50.
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The plurality's justifications for precluding the voluntary
intoxication defense cannot justify eliminating the mental culpability
requirement of every element of a crime.
Since the days of
Blackstone, criminal liability required a "vicious will," and the
Morissette Court remarked that "[c]rime, as a compound concept," is
"no provincial or transient notion."'153 The Morissette Court further
noted that this "compound concept" has enjoyed "unqualified
acceptance" in both British and American common law, and the
current Court (including the members of the Egelhoff plurality) has
accepted Morissette.154
unqualifiedly
and
cited
approvingly
Eliminating the need for the government to prove an accused's mental
culpability for each element of the offense for which he is charged
therefore "offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" and is
155
violative of the accused's due process rights.
Additionally, there is neither general nor specific deterrence
value in prohibiting a mistake of fact defense. A person who acts
under a mistake of fact believes that he is engaging in lawful activity.
But for the mistake, he would be. The Egelhoff plurality found that
the ban on the voluntary intoxication defense would be a general
deterrent for irresponsible behavior caused by a person irresponsibly
becoming intoxicated. Such general deterrence would not occur if a
mistake of fact defense were similarly precluded, for it is implausible
to believe a ban on a mistake of fact defense would deter people from
making mistakes. Similarly, there is no specific deterrence value in
banning a mistake defense. As Singer and Husak note, it is easy to
identify violent drunks, but the identification of "mistake prone"
people and the specific deterrence of those people is a much more
difficult task. 156
Justice Ginsburg's notion that there should be equal culpability
between a person who commits an act while voluntarily intoxicated
and one who commits it "stone sober" is the final justification of the
"majority" that deserves mention. This "equal culpability" rationale
seems limited to voluntary intoxication (and inapposite to the mistake
of fact defense) on two grounds. First, as espoused by the plurality, is
the academic theory that the connection between intoxication and

153. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952).
154. Id. at 251; see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (opinion by Thomas, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter, JJ.) (citing and reaffirming
Morissette).
155. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 43.
156. Singer & Husak, supra note 136, at 923.
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crime is "as much cultural as pharmacological."' 157 In other words, the
Court accepts the skepticism of intoxication's effects on one's criminal
mental culpability; states can conclude, therefore, that an accused can
act with a requisite mens rea while being intoxicated. Second, since
mental culpability and voluntarily intoxication are not mutually
exclusive, the government still has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused acted with the requisite mens rea. As the plurality
admits, the defendant could not have been convicted unless the trial
court found that he acted purposely or knowingly. 158 Singer and
Husak argue that this rationale cannot be justified for mistake of fact
defenses because, unlike voluntarily intoxicated defendants who are at
some level at least arguably culpable, actors who operate under a
mistake of fact "are the epitome of innocence."' 59 There exists no
scholarly opinion, legal precedent, or psychological study that would
60
support equal culpability in a mistake of fact scenario.'
Justice Ginsburg recognized the "wide latitude" enjoyed by the
states in defining the mens rea of crimes committed within their
borders.' 61 Such latitude, however, ends when the mental state of a
crime is statutorily eliminated. The Court announced in Morissette
and has followed ever since the principle that due process requires
proof of mens rea for every element of every crime. Egelhoff simply
holds that a state can enact a statute disallowing evidence of an
accused's voluntary intoxication to negate mental culpability; it does
nothing to limit the constitutional requirement of mental culpability
or the right to present a defense.
B. Forsakingthe Compound Concept-The Current State of Child
Rape Mens Rea Requirements
Four separate views of the mistake of age defense can be
identified in current state statutes. The first group of statutes,
enacted in ten jurisdictions, prohibits the use of the mistake of age
defense for sex offenses in which the age of the victim is an element of
the offense. 162 Second, at the other extreme, is a statutory allowance
157. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 50.
158. Id. at 54.
159. Singer & Husak, supra note 136, at 936.
160. Id. at 936-37.
161. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 58 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
162. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 762(a) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3011(a) (2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.021 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3202(2) (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
14:43.1(b), :80 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.343(1)(a)-(b) (West 2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(c) (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304.5 (1999 & Supp. 2003); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 939.43(2) (West 1996). Connecticut amended its mistake of fact statute to
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of the defense, as espoused in Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, and South
Carolina. 163 The third type of legislation, influenced by the Model
Penal Code, has a "bifurcated defense" whereby the defense is allowed
when criminality is dependent upon a certain (higher) age but
164
eliminating the defense if it is dependent upon a lower critical age.
In other words, the defense is allowed in lesser-grade child sexual
offenses but precluded in the more severe ones.
Lastly, twenty-three states have statutes that neither explicitly
allow nor prohibit the use of the defense, and those jurisdictions' rules
are dependent upon judicial decision. 165 These jurisdictions almost
universally view their child rape statutes as requiring no culpable
mental state, either by judicial decisions interpreting their respective
state's statutes or by the "legislative reenactment" canon of statutory
eliminate the availability as an affirmative defense a mistaken belief of the victim's age. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (West 2001) (amended 1975).
163. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445(b) (Michie 2000) (allowing the Mistake of Age defense if an
accused (1) reasonably believed the victim to be above the critical age, and (2) undertook
reasonable measures to ensure the victim was above that age); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-3(c)
(Michie 1998) (allowing the defense if the accused can prove a reasonable belief the victim was
sixteen years of age or older, regardless of her actual age); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.030 (Michie
1999) (allowing the defense if the accused can show lack of knowledge of the victim's minor age);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-830 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (allowing the defense if the accused can prove a
good faith and reasonable belief the victim was eighteen years of age or older, regardless of her
actual age). Colorado has repealed a statute that made unavailable the Mistake of Age defense.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-406 (repealed 2001).
164. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)-(d), 2243(c) (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(b) (West 2001);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-102(b)-(c) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §
254(2) (West 1964 & Supp. 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.020(2)-(3) (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-01 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(b), 2907.04(A) (West 1997 & Supp.
2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.325(1)-(2) (2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102 (West 2000); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-502 (2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-12 (Michie 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 62-308 (Michie 2003). Illinois has a modified bifurcated scheme, whereby the defense is available
if the accused reasonably believed the victim to be seventeen years of age or older for only
criminal sexual abuse crimes, not the more severe crimes of criminal sexual assault. 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-17 (West 2003). Montana, too, has a variation on this statutory scheme,
by allowing the defense if the accused honestly and reasonably believes the victim is sixteen
years of age or over, but precluding the defense, regardless of the mistake or the statutory age, if
the victim is under fourteen years of age. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(1) (2001).
165. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (1994 & Supp. 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-1, -3, -4 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-730 to -733
(Michie 2003); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.3-.4
(West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 3-304 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 23
(West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b-e (West 1991 & Supp. 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 973-65 (2000 & Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 200.366, .368
(Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:3 to :4 (1996 & Supp. 2003); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10 (McKinney 1998 &
Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7A (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1114 (West 2002);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.1 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22.22.1 (Michie 1998); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (1998); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-61, -63 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.073 (West 2000).
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construction in the face of cases decided decades or even centuries
ago. 166 Many jurisdictions went so far as to reject Hernandez
outright.167 In fact, only two states, California (in Hernandez) and
New Mexico, have read an implied mens rea into their child rape
168
statutes.
C. A Critiqueof Strict Liability
The three rationales for removing the mens rea requirement
for a criminal offense (the public welfare rationale, as described in
Morissette, and the lesser legal wrong and moral wrong rationales of
Prince) were described earlier in this Note. 169 This section critiques
the validity of these rationales as applied to child rape crimes in an
attempt to ultimately show that none of the rationales sufficiently
justifies precluding the availability of the mistake of age defense.
1. The Inapplicability of the Public Welfare Rationale
In defining a strict liability public welfare offense, the
Morissette Court described a narrow classification of offenses, or
166. See Tant v. State, 281 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Buch, 926 P.2d 599,
604-06 (Haw. 1996); State v. Oar, 924 P.2d 599, 601-02 (Idaho 1996); State v. Gilmour, 522
N.W.2d 595, 596-98 (Iowa 1994); Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 54-55 (Md. 1999); Commonwealth
v. Montalvo, 735 N.E.2d 391, 393-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); People v. Cash, 351 N.W.2d 822, 82628 (Mich. 1984); Darden v. State, 798 So.2d 632, 634 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Navarrete,
376 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Neb. 1985); Jenkins v. State, 877 P.2d 1063, 1065-67 (Nev. 1994); Goodrow v.
Perrin, 403 A.2d 864, 867-68 (N.H. 1979); People v. Prise, 515 N.Y.S.2d 387, 391-92 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1987); State v. Anthony, 516 S.E.2d 195, 196-97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Reid v. State, 290 P.2d
775, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955); State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 770-71 (R.I. 1998); Meinders v.
Weber, 604 N.W.2d 248, 264 (S.D. 2000); Jackson v. State, 889 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. App. 1994);
State v. Searles, 621 A.2d 1281, 1282-83 (Vt. 1993); State v. Dodd, 765 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1989). Alabama's leading mistake of age case was decided in 1918. Miller v. State, 79
So. 314, 315 (Ala. Ct. App. 1918). Virginia has not addressed this mistake of age issue in over
one-and-a-quarter centuries. Lawrence v. Comm., 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 845, 854-55 (1878).
167. See, e.g., State v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220, 224 (Iowa 1990) (stating that the Hernandez
rule "has not been the development of the law of criminal intent in this state [and w]e reject the
invitation here to discard the distinction between general intent crimes and those requiring proof
of some specific intent").
168. See People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (Cal. 1964); Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249,
251 (N.M. 1990) (holding that although the statutory definition of statutory rape of a child
between the ages of thirteen and sixteen did not explicitly impose a mental state requirement
regarding the age of the victim, the defendant was entitled to present evidence of his mistake of
age before the jury). It is worth noting that Utah was once among the jurisdictions that followed
the Hernandez principle, but its decision was later abrogated by statute. See State v. Martinez,
52 P.3d 1276 (Utah 2002) (affirming the constitutionality of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401, which
imposes strict liability for unlawful sexual activity with a minor, thereby abrogating State v.
Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 732 (Utah 1984), the court's previous Hernandez-type decision requiring a
mens rea).
169. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
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rather, regulations, that (1) are quasi-torts which involve either
negligence or inaction when either care is required or a duty imposed;
(2) result in no direct or immediate injury; (3) impair the public
health, safety, and welfare, generally on a societal level; and (4) yield
small penalties and minimal social stigma. 170 Public welfare offenses
"do not fit neatly into any ...accepted common law offenses, such as
171
those against the state, the person, property, or public morals."'
Child sexual assault is a common law offense against the
person. It does not involve either negligence or inaction, and it does
not impair the public health, safety, or welfare on a macro level.
Moreover, using Tennessee as our model, a conviction for a first-time
offender carries a mandatory twenty-year sentence with no possibility
of parole, probation, or jail credit. 172 As such, child sexual assault
cannot be classified as a public welfare offense, and its status as a
strict liability offense cannot be supported under this rationale.
2. Deconstructing the Lesser Legal Wrong and Moral Wrong
Rationales
Morissette's public welfare justification of strict liability crimes
encompasses only a narrow range of consumer and social protection
offenses like mistakenly selling adulterated milk or mislabeling
pharmaceuticals. 173 The Court points out in a footnote, however, that
statutory rape-type offenses have been one of the exceptions to the
rule that "[c]rime ... generally constitute[s] only from concurrence of
an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand."174 This seeming
contradiction can be resolved in either of two ways. First, the footnote
can be seen as merely a tangential point apart from and irrelevant to
the Court's principal reasoning, a point which the Court neither
accepted nor rejected. 175 Alternatively, one could view the Court's
reference to statutory rape-type offenses as an example of the common
law acceptance of both the lesser legal wrong and moral wrong
170. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952).
171. Id. at 255.
172. Rape of a Child is a Class A felony in Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-522(b)
(2003). Class A felonies carry a mandatory sentence of generally twenty years, and Rape of a
Child is one of the offenses enumerated for which parole is unavailable. §§ 40-35-112, -501(i).
173. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (discussing earlier Massachusetts cases affirming
convictions for such an offense); see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278 (1943).
174. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251 & n.8.
175. See State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 776 n.17 (R.I. 1988) (Flanders, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Supreme Court merely acknowledged ... that many states came to recognize an exception to the
common-law rule of mens rea with respect to a mistake-of-age defense in sex-offense
prosecutions. The Court never ventured to opine whether the imposition of strict liability in such
cases was proper, principled, or constitutional.").
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rationales of criminal guilt. Regardless of whether the Court intended
the former or latter, the modern legitimacy of these two rationales
176
must be evaluated.
The lesser legal wrong rationale posits that an accused is guilty
of any crime he commits so long as he would have been committing at
least some illegal act if the facts were as he believed them to be. 177 In
the child rape context, if an accused is operating under a mistaken
belief that his paramour is of the age of consent, he could be found
guilty under the lesser legal wrong theory only if fornication or, if he
were married, adultery, were crimes as well. Today, just eight states
still criminalize fornication, 178 and only nine criminalize adultery, 179
with each offense punishable as a misdemeanor. 8 0 Even in those
states that recognize one or both offenses, "the 'legal' wrong[s] that the
accused might have supposed he was committing [are] to a great
extent ignored or even condoned by both society and the courts...
[and the] [1]aws punishing [them] are generally unenforced."' 18 1 In
Tennessee, neither adultery nor fornication is a criminal offense.
Moreover, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court has held
unconstitutional laws banning consensual sodomy, recognizing a right
to engage in otherwise consensual, private, intimate conduct.' 8 2
176. See id. at 780 ("Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, a seemingly unanimous front of legal
commentary has opposed the concept of strict liability for [child rape] crime[s] as lacking any
sound philosophical, historical, or legal foundation and, what is even worse, as having its origin
in faulty and inept judicial analysis of applicable precedents.").
177. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. 2 (1980).
178. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (2003) (held unconstitutional by In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441,
444 (Ga. 2003)); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-8 (West
2003) (making fornication a misdemeanor only if it is "open and notorious"); MASS GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (West 2000) (imposing a fine of only $30 or imprisonment for not more than
three months); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op.
2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-8-3 (Michie 2000) (imposing a minimum fine of only $20). Mississippi and North
Carolina define fornication to include an element of cohabitation. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1
(2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2003). Wisconsin recreated its fornication statute to prohibit
only "public fornication," and North Dakota criminalizes only the commission of "a sexual act in
a public place." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (1997 & Supp. 2003); WIS. CODE ANN. § 944.15
(effective Feb. 1, 2003).
179. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1975); COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-501 (West 2003); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 798.01 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (Michie
1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.30 (West 1991); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2000). North Carolina criminalizes adultery if there is
cohabitation. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-184.

180. See supra notes 178-179.
181. Myers, supra note 7, at 128; see also Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1986)
(noting that the last reported conviction under Virginia's anti-fornication statute was in 1849).
182. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003) ("Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.").
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"By definition, [the lesser legal wrong] transferring [of] intent
from one crime to another requires two crimes."18 3 Therefore, in light
of the majority of states' decriminalization of such "lesser wrongs" as
fornication and adultery, as well as the Supreme Court's Lawrence
decision, the lesser legal wrong rationale is no longer applicable to
18 4
child rape offenses.
The moral wrong rationale, which would assign liability on the
basis of the commission of an act society considers morally repugnant,
is equally illegitimate. Scholars have argued that the moral wrong
rationale has little persuasiveness on several grounds. First, it is
contended that there are varying degrees of morality, and that
perceptions of morality differ among and between various community
groups.18 5 Second, and this perhaps follows from the previous critique,
laws are enacted to divorce the concepts of "immoral" and "illegal."
"Using immorality as the basis for inferring serious criminal intent,
especially when the accused is not even aware that the act is criminal,
seems unjustifiable and unfair."'18 6 Third, notions of what constitutes
immoral behavior evolve temporally, and with the case of sexual
activity, premarital relations between consenting adults cannot be
deemed immoral to the point of requiring that they be criminal.' 8 7 In
fact, the Supreme Court recently held that, as between "two adults
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engage[ ] in sexual
practices," a state may not "control their destiny by making their
88
private sexual conduct a crime."'
Finally, if we accept the idea that premarital sex is not
immoral in and of itself, as a majority of states appear to have done by
183. Reiss, supra note 60, at 382.
184. Admittedly, if one engages in sexual relations with a child under thirteen operating
under the mistaken fact that the alleged victim is between the ages of thirteen and seventeen,
the adult would be committing a lesser legal wrong of Statutory Rape. TENN. CODE ANN. § 3911-502 (2003). This conflict will be resolved infra. Part IV.
185. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 7, at 128 ("It must be recognized that different individuals
and groups in a heterogeneous community have widely divergent opinions with respect to the
morality of extra-marital intercourse. Although certain groups, and perhaps the law itself, may
judge such conduct to be wrong, it may be in complete conformity with the standards of the
actors' peer group.").
186. Reiss, supra note 60, at 382; see also LAFAVE, supra note 1, 5.6(c), at 288 ("Moral duties
should not be identified with criminal duties." (quoting Graham Hughes, Criminal
Responsibility, 16 STAN. L. REV. 470, 481 (1964))).

187. See Reiss, supra note 60, at 382-83 ("Events in ...history, such as the sexual
revolution, the advent of the birth control pill, and television advertisements for condoms
evidence [a] change in public opinion [of what is moral]."); see also Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d
797, 813 (Md. 1993) (Bell, J., dissenting) ("[Slexual intercourse between consenting unmarried
adults and minors who have reached the age of consent is not now clearly considered to be
immoral ...").
188. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
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eliminating fornication from their criminal codes, should a person be
held "morally" accountable when that is the only activity in which he
intended to engage? It is nearly universally accepted that a person
who engages in sexual relations with a child is morally repugnant, but
that repugnance is due most likely not to the act itself, but to the
intent (or mere desire) to engage in that activity. If an individual's
intent is to engage in sexual relations with a consenting adult, he
intends to commit an act that is, if not moral, not immoral. If a person
honestly and reasonably believes certain facts that would make his
conduct fall within Lawrence's constitutionally protected private
sphere, he should not be criminally punished for an act committed
under this mistaken belief.
3. Failing To See the Revolution Through-The Disingenuousness of
the Model Penal Code
Removing mental culpability from child rape crimes cannot be
supported under the public welfare rationale, nor can it be supported
currently under the lesser legal wrong or moral wrong rationales.
Both the American Law Institute (ALI), in promulgating its Model
Penal Code, and Larry Myers, in crafting his article cited frequently
throughout this Note, were aware of the unsatisfactory justifications
for making the child rape crimes strict liability offenses. 18 9 In its
Comment to the M.P.C. mistake of age provision, the ALI remarked:
[T]he actor who reasonably believes in the existence of facts that, if true, would render
his conduct non-criminal has substantial claim for exculpation. Even if society chooses
to set the age of consent very low, the actor who reasonably believes that his partner is
above that age lacks culpability with respect to the factor deemed critical to liability.
Punishing him anyway simply because his intended conduct would have been immoral
under the facts as he supposed them to be postulates a relation between criminality and
immorality that is inaccurate on both descriptive and normative grounds. The penal
law does not try to enforce all aspects of community morality, and any thoroughgoing
attempt to do so would extend the prospect of criminal sanctions far into the sphere of
individual liberty and create a regime too demanding for all save the best among us. 190

The Model Penal Code, which, as noted previously,
philosophically requires a finding of culpability for every element of
every crime and limits strict liability to civil "violations," attempts to
"effect[ ] a compromise between the traditional rule disallowing
mistake in the law of statutory rape and a general policy against strict
liability crimes."'191 Instead, when a mistake of age defense is being
offered by an accused, the M.P.C. shifts the burden to the defendant to
189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. 2 (1980); Myers, supra note 7, at 127-29.
190. § 213.6 cmt. 2.
191. Id.
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"establish both the fact and reasonableness of his mistake by a
preponderance
of the evidence. ' 192
This requirement of
reasonableness, according to the Code's drafters, ensures that the
mistake does not amount to a conscious disregard of community
standards. 193 This also would avoid placing on the prosecution the
"virtually impossible" burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
194
the absence of a mistake.
The Model Penal Code, in other words, allows the prosecution
to prove that an accused engaged in sexual relations with a child
under the statutory age, thereby creating a rebuttable presumption
that the accused acted with a culpable mens rea. This presumption
can be rebutted upon an accused's proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that he committed the actus reus under a reasonable belief
that his partner was a consenting adult. In other words, an accused's
defense will be successful if he can prove that a reasonable person
would have made the same mistake.
Allowing a defense like this seems a reasonable and effective
means of overcoming the problem of convicting a person of a serious
felony when he lacked any mental culpability. This defense is not
available in all cases, however. Both the ALI and Myers, as well as
the majority of states that have either adopted the M.P.C. or followed
its direction, while appreciating the need for punishing only those who
possess the criminal intent to commit the crime, still stop short of
making available the mistake of age defense in all child rape
prosecutions. 195 The M.P.C. allows the defense if the criminality of the
offense depends on a child victim being below a critical age other than
ten, but if criminality depends on a child victim being below the age of
ten, "it is no defense that the actor did not know the child's age, or
reasonably believed the child to be older than 1O."196 Myers, who
would set the age of consent at sixteen, would impose strict liability if
the child was under thirteen, but would allow the defense of an honest
and reasonable mistake of fact if the child was between the ages of
19 7
thirteen and fifteen.

192. Id.
193. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (defining "negligence").
194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. 2 (1980).

195. For a list of states that have a two-tiered statutory approach regarding the Mistake of
Age defense, see supra note 164.
196. § 213.6(1).
197. Myers, supra note 7, at 132. Myers chooses this age because "[w]hen a girl is sixteen,
she has become a young woman, and the consensual act loses its quality of abnormality,
heinousness, and physical danger to her." Id.
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Both the drafters of the M.P.C. and Myers explain their twotiered approach biologically, but for slightly different reasons. Myers
argues that "it is in this period of pre-puberty and initial puberty that
the girl is just gaining the physical capacity to engage in intercourse,
but remains seriously deficient in comprehension of the social,
198
psychological, emotional, and physical significance of sexuality."'
The Comment to the M.P.C., on the other hand, reasons that "no
credible error regarding the age of a child in fact less than ten years
old would render the actor's conduct anything less than a dramatic
departure from societal norms ... for no credible error of perception
would be sufficient to recharacterize a child of such tender years as an
appropriate subject of sexual gratification."'199
In order to advance his two-tiered approach, Myers cites
findings from the Kinsey Institute establishing sixteen as the
"beginning of adult life"-physically, socially, and intellectually. 20 0 He
does not explain, however, how he chooses thirteen as the critical
strict liability age, except to note that "very few girls enter the period
20
of sexual awakening before the thirteenth year." '
A person that engages in sexual relations with a child between
the ages of thirteen and sixteen, according to Myers, contravenes not
physical standards but moral standards of the community. 20 2 In other
words, Myers constructs his rape/mistake/nonrape framework based
on the victim's abilities to physically engage in sexual intercourse and
to comprehend the "social, psychological, emotional, and physical
significance of sexuality."20 3
If this is indeed Myers's critical
distinction, his argument seems disingenuous. He determines the age
of consent at sixteen based on empirical findings, but would impose
strict liability if a child is in the "pre-puberty and initial puberty
stages" (below thirteen) while allowing the mistake of age defense for
a child in "middle to later adolescence." 20 4 Such a distinction is
created in order to give "full credence to a realistic age dichotomy
when the man is genuinely mistaken." 20 5 Yet by noting that "very
few" girls enter their "period of sexual awakening" before age thirteen,

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
§ 231.6(1) cmt. 2.
Myers, supra note 7, at 132-33.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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Myers is conceding that there are cases where a girl may be "sexually
20 6
awake" at that young age.
Based on Myers's thesis that a reasonable mistake of age is a
needed defense in child rape prosecutions and his critique of the
"misguided morality" of strict liability in this context, it should follow
that a person who engages in sexual intercourse with one of those very
few pubescent children under any critical age should be entitled to at
least offer his reasonable mistake of age at trial.20 7 The same
argument could be advanced with the Model Penal Code's critical age
of ten-although it is extremely unlikely that a child under that age
could be reasonably mistaken for an adult of the age of consent, there
indeed may be instances, however extreme and implausible, where
that unlikely event occurs. 208
"Precocious puberty," or pubertal
development at an early age and an accelerated rate, has long been
recognized as a serious, if infrequent, medical problem. 20 9 However, in
recent years, the prevalence of young girls entering pubescence at an
earlier age has increased. 210 In 1999, the American Academy of
Pediatrics, relying on a 1997 study involving 1,500 pediatricians and
17,000 girls between the ages of three and twelve, concluded that
puberty is normal in girls as young as six. 211 Although the causes are
unknown, childhood obesity and advances in nutritional supplements
may be responsible. 2 12 The result is that more girls experience
puberty at an early age and can appear much more developed than
their actual years.
All concerns about the uncertain timing of the onset of puberty
in children aside, the Model Penal Code's mistake of age provision is
206. Id.
207. Id. at 105-19, 132.
208. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (1980).

209. See, e.g., Grace Brooke Huffman, Reassessing the Age Limit of Precocious Puberty in
Girls, 61 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1850 (Mar. 15, 2000) ("Standard textbooks usually define
precocious puberty as 'development of secondary sexual characteristics' in girls less than eight
years of age.").
210. See generally Sandra G. Boodman, Girls and Puberty: How Young Is Too Young?; New
Guidelines Say Signs of Development as Early as Age 6 May Not Be Abnormal, WASH. POST, Oct.
26, 1999, at Z07; Jane E. Brody, Yesterday's PrecociousPuberty Is Norm Today, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 1999, at F8; Tara Parker-Pope, Rise in Early Puberty Causes Parentsto Ask, "When Is It Too
Soon?, "WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000, at B1.
211. Paul B. Kaplowitz et al., Reexamination of the Age Limit for Defining When Puberty Is
Precocious in Girls in the United States: Implications for Evaluation and Treatment, 104
PEDIATRICS 936, 936-40 (1999) (relying on data obtained in Marcia Herman-Giddens et al.,
Secondary Sexual Characteristicsand Menses in Young Girls Seen in Office Practice:A Study
from the PediatricResearch in Office Settings Network, 99 PEDIATRICS 505 (1997)). The study
bases its conclusion upon its findings that 7 percent of white and 25 percent of African-American
females begin to develop breasts before the age of eight. Id.
212. See id. at 937.
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also troublesome because it is inconsistent with the Code's
philosophical framework requiring a showing of mental culpability for
every element
of every offense and abolishing strict liability for all but
"violations."2 13 This is in direct conflict with the Code's "frontal
attack" on strict liability in which the drafters "superimposed on the
entire corpus of the law" a requirement of no penal sanctions without
mental culpability except in the narrow instance of regulatory
violations. 2 14 After all, rape of a child less than ten years old is a
second-degree felony in the Code-the only felony that does not
require a culpable mental state. 215 The ALI even acknowledges this
contradiction, noting that it is "debatable whether the rule of strict
liability is satisfactory" in child rape prosecutions, and admitting its
proposal is a compromise between the Code's philosophical framework
216
and traditional abhorrence of crimes against children.
The drafters of the M.P.C. advance two additional reasons for
crafting their rule as chosen: (1) even if an accused could assert a
defense, his conduct, by its nature, is a gross deviation of community
standards; and (2) it would be otherwise impossible for a prosecutor to
2 17
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused was not mistaken.
Again, neither of these justifications is satisfactory. As to the former,
the remainder of the Code makes it clear that a person who operates
under a mistake of fact cannot be criminally liable if the mistake
negates the requisite intent of a given element of the offense. 218 The
latter justification is completely in conflict with notions of due process.
It is constitutionally mandated that in order for a deprivation of an
accused's liberty to occur, the prosecution must generally prove
21 9
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense.
213. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), 2.05 (1985).

214. § 2.05 cmt. 1.
215. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (1980).

216. § 213.6 cmt. 2.
217. Id.
218. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) cmt. 1 (1985); see also United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1994) (holding that the Constitution mandates a presumption of
scienter for every element of an offense that would criminalize otherwise innocent conduct). At
issue in X-Citement Video was the mental state required as to the age element of the Protection
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000)), which made
criminal the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of
pornographic materials depicting children in a sexually lewd and lascivious manner. Id. at 6566. Although a "most natural grammatical reading" of the statute would not apply the mental
state "knowingly" to the age element of the offense, the Court read the statute as requiring
knowledge of the age of the children depicted in the pornographic materials. Id. at 68-74. A
reading of the statute as written would have criminalized lawful conduct, namely the First
Amendment right to view and produce sexually explicit materials. Id. at 73-74.
219. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985) ('The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
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The Code demonstrates the importance of the compound
concept of criminal law and the severity of penal liability. The
mistake of age provision is inapposite to the Code's otherwise
consistent application of this philosophy. Because there may be a
person who both honestly and reasonably believes that his sexual
partner is of the age of consent, regardless of her true age, it would be
more consistent for the Code to allow that person to offer that defense
to a jury. The Code allows the defense if the victim's critical age is
over ten, but mistake of age can exist regardless of whether the child
is above or below the critical age. It is important to note that the
mistake would only exonerate an accused if a jury found that a
reasonable person would have likewise been mistaken about the
child's age.
Given the findings by Myers and the social norms
enunciated by the Code, it is extremely unlikely that a jury would so
find. However, in the instances where they may so find, it is
imperative that a morally blameless defendant not be convicted of a
serious felony. It is axiomatic that "it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free," and it necessarily
follows that a morally innocent man should not be deprived of his
220
liberties.
D. An Answer from Above? The Alaska Supreme Court and Mistake
Jurisprudence
Of the jurisdictions that permit the mistake of age defense in at
least some form, only one has held that such a defense is
constitutionally guaranteed to an accused. Only the Alaska Supreme
Court has held unconstitutional a statute disallowing the mistake of
age defense. A pair of Alaska decisions, State v. Guest 22 1 and State v.
Fremgen,222 caused that state to follow and then advance the
Hernandez principle beyond the limitation of legislative abrogation of
a mens rea requirement.
In Guest, the court held that a defendant can defend against a
charge of statutory rape by showing that he operated under an honest
and reasonable mistake of fact as to the victim's age. 223 Noting that
"consciousness of wrongdoing is an essential element of penal

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
(internal quotations omitted)).
220. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
221. 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
222. 914 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1996).
223. Guest, 583 P.2d at 840.
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liability,"224 the court held that it would be a "deprivation of liberty
without due process of law to convict a person of a serious crime
without the requirement of criminal intent. '225 The court held that
such a requirement could only be excepted for public welfare offenses,
the Morissette-type regulatory offenses that impose small penalties
and minimal social stigma. 226 Since a conviction for statutory rape in
Alaska carried a potential sentence of twenty years (if the defendant
was under nineteen years old) or life imprisonment (if the defendant
was nineteen years of age or older), the court held that it "may not
appropriately be categorized as a public welfare offense. It is a serious
felony." 227 The statute, as it existed before Guest, was silent as to a
requisite mens rea and, "where the particular statute is not a public
welfare type of offense, either a requirement of criminal intent must
be read into the statute or it must be found unconstitutional." 228 In an
effort to construe the statute as constitutional, the court held it
"necessary ...to infer a requirement of criminal intent."229
After Guest, the Alaska legislature rewrote its child rape
statutes, creating an age-dependent statutory rape scheme whereby it
considered sexual relations with a person under thirteen years of age
to be sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, but, if an alleged
victim was between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, the crime was a
lesser offense. 230 Additionally, the legislature amended its mistake of
age provision to prohibit the defense for those faced with the firstdegree charge, providing that in sexual abuse offenses defined upon a
victim's age, "it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the
alleged offense, the defendant reasonably believed the victim to be
that age or older, unless the victim was under 13 years of age at the
time of the alleged offense."231 In Fremgen, the Alaska Court of
Appeals was asked to determine the constitutionality of this statute
and, in light of Guest, held that it unconstitutionally violated an
accused's due process rights. 232
The Alaska Supreme Court
approvingly affirmed the lower court's ruling and dismissed the
2 33
State's appeal.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 838.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 839.
Id. (emphasis added).
ALASKA STAT. §§ li.41.434(a)(1)-.436(a)(1) (Michie 2000).
State v. Fremgen, 889 P.2d 1083, 1083-84 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (citing former §

11.41.445(b)).

232. Id. at 1083, 1085.
233. State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996).
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The defendant in Fremgen was charged with sexual abuse of a
minor in the first degree for engaging in a sexual relationship with a
girl under thirteen years old. 234 The defendant advanced the defense
that he reasonably believed the girl to be over sixteen, and the trial
judge, after finding "a substantial basis that [the child] exhibited a
sexual and physical maturity which could lead a reasonable person to
believe that she was older than her actual age of just under thirteen
years," permitted Mr. Fremgen to present as an affirmative defense
his honest and reasonable mistake of the child's age.2 35 The court of
2 36
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to allow the defense.
However, while the trial judge limited his ruling to the statute's
constitutionality as it applied to Mr. Fremgen, the court of appeals
held the statute prima facie unconstitutional. 237 It reasoned that
"convicting [the defendant] ... without allowing him to present the
affirmative defense of a reasonable mistake of age would violate his
right to due process of law under the Alaska Constitution. '238 In
reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied on the Guest rule that
a criminal statute proscribing activity other than a public welfare
offense can only be constitutional if a requisite criminal intent is
either enumerated or inferable.2 3 9 Since the mistake of age statute
240
eliminated criminal intent, it could not pass constitutional muster.
In a brief opinion dismissing the State's appeal of the lower court's
ruling, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "it would be a deprivation
of liberty without due process of law to convict a person of a serious
crime without the requirement of criminal intent" 24 ' and that "except
for public welfare type of offenses, strict criminal liability without
some form of mens rea is violative of Alaska's Constitution. 2 4 2
These Alaska cases held that an accused is entitled to present a
defense of mistake or ignorance regardless of the underlying felony
offense, and that any statutory preclusion from so doing violates its
state constitution. They are instructive on how best to solve the
234. Fremgen, 889 P.2d at 1083.
235. Id. at 1084.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1085 ('The clear language of Guest is sweeping, and unmistakably requires the
state to prove criminal intent for the conviction of a serious crime.").
241. Fremgen, 914 P.2d at 1245.
242. Id. at 1246. The Alaska Constitution's Due Process Clause contains language nearly
identical to its federal analogue. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Ior
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ")
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seeming conflict between the compound concept and child rape
prosecutions. In light of Morissette, the right to present a defense
cases, and the philosophical framework of the Model Penal Code, child
rape should not (and constitutionally must not) be classified as a strict
liability offense. Although Fremgen carries no precedential weight
beyond Alaska's borders, it should be influential because it makes
243
sense as good policy and constitutional theory.
IV. REVIVING THE COMPOUND CONCEPT: PROPOSALS FOR CURRENT
AND FUTURE CHILD RAPE PROSECUTIONS

In light of the advances and shortcomings of the Model Penal
Code's reforms, the current statutory and jurisprudential landscape of
strict liability in child rape prosecutions, and Fremgen's constitutional
interpretations, a solution to the problem of forsaking the compound
concept in favor of policy considerations can be reached. This Part will
provide such a solution by proposing amendments to the Tennessee
Code's rape of a child and mistake of fact provisions.
The
amendments would take into account the Blackstonian "vicious will"
requirement, and the policy justifications advanced for strict liability
in this context. As noted previously, Tennessee is merely the model
with which this Note is working; the proposed solution is not limited
244
to that state.

243. Additionally, it is worth noting that many states find broader protections within their
constitutions than have been found under the Bill of Rights See, e.g., State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d
265, 268 (Tenn. 1992) (finding broader protections in Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution regarding selfincrimination).
244. An attorney practicing in Tennessee may wish to advance the argument that statutory
construction and Tennessee case law require that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant accused of committing Rape of a Child act at least recklessly with regard to the
victim's age. Although the Mistake of Fact defense has been statutorily eliminated for Rape of a
Child and Aggravated Sexual Battery of a Child offenses, the age elements of each offense are
not strict liability elements. The Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held that a person
accused of Aggravated Sexual Battery of a Child can only be convicted if he acts recklessly
toward the victim's age. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn. 1998). In State v.
Howard, the defendant was convicted of Aggravated Sexual Battery of a Child. Id. at 581. Such
an offense is defined as the "unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant... [when,
inter alia] the victim is less than thirteen (13) years of age." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-504(a)(4)
(2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the statute in question "neither pr[o]scribes
nor 'plainly dispenses with'" the culpable mens rea as to whether the victim is less than thirteen
years old. Howard, 926 S.W.2d at 587. As such, the Court held that intent, knowledge, or
recklessness as to the age of the victim is necessary to sustain a conviction for Aggravated
Sexual Battery of a Child. Id.
Although the incidents at issue in Howard took place prior to the 1995 Amendment,
subsequent cases, whose opinions and facts occurred after the Amendment, have upheld the

734

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2:693

In crafting a solution that furthers the compound concept of the
criminal law and meets due process mandates while also recognizing
the social abhorrence of sex crimes against children, it is important to
remember that implementation of a mistake of age defense does not
create acceptance of an accused's actions, nor does it trivialize the
horrific effects of sexual assaults on victim and society alike. The
purpose of allowing a defense is to reaffirm the Anglo-American
requirement of a culpable mental state for every material element of
an offense.

Howard rule. See State v. Salcido, No. M1999-00501-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 227357, at *10
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2001) (holding that in a prosecution for Aggravated Sexual Battery of
a Child, "reckless conduct applie[s] ...to the element regarding age"); State v. Black, No. 02C019803-CR-00081, 1999 WL 280810, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 1999) ('The mens rea required
for aggravated sexual battery involving a victim less than 13 years of age has been held to
include intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct.").
The only two offenses for which the Mistake of Fact defense is statutorily prohibited are
Rape of a Child and Aggravated Sexual Battery of a Child. § 39-11-502. The Howard line of
cases hold that when one is charged with Aggravated Sexual Battery of a Child, the State must
prove that the defendant acted at least recklessly with regard to the victim's age. Salcido, 2001
WL 227357, at *10; Black, 1999 WL 280810, at *3; Howard, 926 S.W.2d at 587. Since
Aggravated Sexual Battery of a Child requires scienter for the victim's age regardless of the
unavailability of the Mistake of Fact defense, it could be argued that a similar mental element is
required for one accused of Rape of a Child. Neither statute "plainly dispenses with" the mental
state, and the jury instructions for both offenses require that the State prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that "the defendant acted either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly." §§ 3911-301(b)-(c), 39-13-504(a)(4), -522(a); TENN. PATrERN JURY INSTR. §§ 10.03(3), -.12(3). It follows,
therefore, that because the 1995 Amendment did not make Aggravated Sexual Battery of a Child
a strict liability offense as to the alleged victim's age, it did not make Rape of a Child a strict
liability offense as to the alleged victim's age as well. As such, the argument would go, an
accused cannot be convicted unless the State proves beyond any reasonable doubt that he acted
at least recklessly as to the victim's age.
A jury instruction alerting the jury of the State's necessity to prove a culpable mens rea as to
the age element would accomplish many of the same goals as a pure Mistake of Fact defense
instruction. The purpose of the Mistake of Fact defense is obvious: unless the defendant
committed the actus reus while exhibiting a culpable mens rea, he can be found guilty of no
crime. The Mistake of Fact statute merely codifies this universal tenet of common law. As made
clear by the post-Amendment case, Salcido, a defendant can only be convicted of Aggravated
Sexual Battery of a Child if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted at least
recklessly as to the victim's age. Salcido, 2001 WL 227357, at *10. This is remarkably similar, if
not completely identical, to a mistake of fact defense if not explicitly called such a defense.
As Professor LaFave illustrates, using the Mistake of Fact defense is analogous to
demonstrating that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proving the defendant's culpable
mens rea. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 5.6(a), at 282-83.
Under Tennessee Law, perhaps
nonsensically, the former is proscribed from a defendant charged with Rape of a Child while the
latter is available. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-502, -13-522 (2003). In other words, a defendant
cannot use the Mistake of Fact defense, but his mistaken belief as to the circumstance element
will prevent the State from proving a culpable mens rea. It seems, therefore, that the Tennessee
Code proscribes the Mistake of Fact defense for Rape of a Child in name only; the principles of,
justifications for, and effects of such a defense, A la the LaFave view, can all be achieved by a
jury instruction regarding the State's burden of proving mens rea culpability.
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The solution itself is simple enough: allow an accused to
present a defense that he engaged in sexual intercourse under the
reasonable and honest mistake that his partner was of the age of
consent. In other words, states that follow the Model Penal Code's
bifurcated critical age model should allow the mistake defense for sex
crimes regardless of the victim's age. However, since all but four
jurisdictions preclude the use of the mistake of age defense entirely
when the victim is under some critical age, it is apparent that a
245
blanket use of the defense is both problematic and undesirable.
Instead, the mistake defense should be one that requires both
246
extrinsic evidence and a heightened burden of persuasion.
Giving defendants an opportunity to present a mistake of age
defense forces a confrontation with the concerns expressed by the
drafters of the M.P.C. regarding community standards and making
conviction harder to obtain. 247 Further, if the age element were read,
as argued previously, as requiring the subjective recklessness
standard, the reasonableness of the mistake would not matter.
Rewriting the statute so that the age element required mere
negligence would accomplish three things: (1) it would mandate that
the mistake of age be reasonable such that members of a jury must
ask themselves whether, if they were in the same situation, they
would mistake the child for being of the age of consent; (2) it would
make it easier for a prosecutor to meet his burden of proving that the
accused should have known that his partner was below the statutory
age; and (3) it keeps the burden of proof on the prosecution without
creating an unconstitutional presumption of guilt. 248
Once the
prosecution proves that the accused acted at least negligently,
however, a "reverse presumption" of guilt is made-that is, the

245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 435-50, 462-69 (1993) (surveying commonwealth countries' availability of
the "good faith" defense to strict liability offenses and crafting an American model that would
allow a defendant charged with such an offense to prove an honest and reasonable mistake of
fact). Professor Levenson argues that a defendant should be allowed to proffer evidence that he
operated under a mistake after undertaking reasonable efforts to learn the true facts and was
mistaken only by deception. Id. at 462-63. In order to prevent meritless defenses and preserve
the statutory presumption of intent by the very commission of the proscribed act, she would
require the defendant meet a higher burden of proof in advancing his defense. Id. at 465-68.
247. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. 2 (1980).
248. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a jury
instruction creating a rebuttable presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion of intent to
the defendant in a murder trial after the prosecution proved that the underlying act was

committed).
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defendant will be presumed guilty unless he proves a lack of mental
249
culpability.
Such a reverse presumption, however, would not be
irrebuttable. The M.P.C. allows a presumption to be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence. Another modification to a blanket
mistake provision would be to raise the burden of persuasion to clear
and convincing evidence. 250 A raised burden of proof would require
the accused to provide ample extrinsic evidence that his mistake of
age was reasonable and would also help offset concerns that a rapidly
maturing victim could appear older during trial than at the time of the
alleged offense, thereby making an erroneous defense easier to prove.
The last issue to address is the lesser legal wrong rationale.
The Tennessee mistake statute provides that when a person
mistakenly believes he is committing one crime yet commits another,
he can be convicted only of that which he thought he was
committing. 251 If an accused presents testimony that he believed his
partner was between the ages of thirteen and seventeen, under the
mistake provisions he would be guilty of statutory rape and could
serve as little as eighty-one days in prison. 252 Given the stark contrast
in sentences and the ever-maturing physical appearance of the victim,
this could yield a rise in disingenuous but credible mistake of age

249. Levenson, supra note 246, at 467 ("The good faith defense is in essence a reverse
presumption. Ordinarily, we presume that a defendant who commits a particular act is not
guilty unless he does so with a culpable intent. The presumption in strict liability cases is
exactly the opposite.").
250. § 213.6(1) ("[I]t is a defense for the actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age."). Under Tennessee law, a jury
finding of any reasonable doubt on the issue as to whether the defendant acted through
ignorance or mistake of fact requires an acquittal. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-203(d) (2003);
cf. Levenson, supra note 246, at 464-68 (arguing that states may require either clear and
convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but favoring the latter to insure that
[o]nly in the extraordinary case could the defendant rebut that presumption [of guilt]"). It is
important to note that Professor Levenson's argument is limited to "classic" strict liability
offenses. See id. at 464 (using the example of speeding). In the child rape context, with such
severe penalties, requiring the defendant prove beyond a reasonable doubt an honest and
reasonable mistake seems too high a burden to meet. Conversely, the lower standards in both
the M.P.C. and Tennessee Code could lead, as noted previously, to disingenuous defenses that
would undermine the criminal justice system. Requiring clear and convincing evidence, it
follows, raises the burden of proof high enough that it will prevent the success of virtually all
meritless mistake defenses, but is not so high as to foreclose many if not all truly honest and
reasonable ones.
251. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-502(b) ("Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact may
constitute a defense to the offense charged, the person may be convicted of the offense for which
the person would be guilty if the fact were as the person believed."). The Tennessee provision is
analogous to the Model Penal Code's Mistake of Fact provision. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2)
(1985).
252. See supra note 16.
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defenses. If an accused engages in sexual intercourse with a twelveyear-old child, that child may look starkly different as a thirteen-yearold during trial. Presenting a mistake of age defense on the grounds
that the accused operated under an honest and reasonable belief that
the child was thirteen would enable the accused to effectively reduce
his prison sentence by at least nineteen and a half years. This,
therefore, presents a converse problem: should an accused who did
operate under an honest and reasonable mistake of age but thought he
was committing statutory rape be sentenced to twenty years in prison?
Perhaps a solution to this conundrum would be to amend the rape of a
child provision to provide that a person who mistakenly believed that
he engaged in sexual intercourse with a child between the ages of
thirteen and seventeen when the child was actually less than thirteen
is guilty of a lower grade offense, such as a Class B Felony. 253 Such an
amendment would treat such a mistake as a mitigating factor, and the
higher burden of persuasion articulated above would minimize the
instances of disingenuous mistake of age defenses from being
254
effectively employed.
In sum, Tennessee, like Alaska, should allow the mistake of
age defense for all criminal offenses. In the context of rape of a child,
however, the use of the mistake of age defense should be limited by:
(1) changing the burden of proof of the age element to negligence; (2)
heightening the defense's burden of proving his mistake to clear and
convincing evidence; and (3) providing that an accused who asserts
that he honestly and reasonably mistook his partner's age yet thought
he was committing statutory rape will be guilty of a Class B Felony if
the jury finds such a mistake by clear and convincing evidence. The
statutes would then read as follows (modifications italicized):

253. Class B Felonies carry, for first-time offenders, a sentence from eight to twelve years.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-112(a)(2). For Class B Felonies, the presumptive sentence is the
minimum of the range, and those convicted of such offenses can receive 25 percent jail credit
toward early release and would be eligible for parole after serving 30 percent of their sentence.
§§ 41-21-236, 40-35-210(c).
254. At first blush, this proposal may seem in conflict with the thesis of this Note.
Employing the lesser legal wrong theory in a way inconsistent with both the Tennessee and
Model Penal Code is rather a means of harmonizing policy considerations with a defendant's
right to present a defense. The goal of this Note is to allow the Mistake of Age defense to those
defendants that honestly and reasonably operated under such a mistake; it is not to provide a
defendant with a plausible, yet disingenuous defense. Although a conviction for Statutory Rape
carries, after jail credit and automatic parole, a sentence of less than three months, a conviction
for a Class B Felony would carry, after jail credits and discretionary parole, a sentence of 646
days, or approximately one year and nine and one-half months. §§ 41-21-236, 40-35-210(c).
Using a mistake of Statutory Rape, therefore, seems an adequate compromise between the
competing interests of society and a defendant.
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522:
(a) Rape of a child is the unlawful sexual penetration of a
victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if such victim is
less than thirteen (13) years of age and the defendant negligently
disregardedthe victim's age.
(b) Rape of a child is a Class A felony.
(c)
(d) If the defendant would otherwise be guilty under Subsection
(a) but asserts a Mistake of Age defense pursuant to Section 39-11502(c)(2), he shall be guilty of a Class B felony.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-502:
(a) Except in prosecutions for violations of §§ 39-13-504(a)(4)
and 39-13-522, ignorance or mistake of fact is a defense to prosecution
if such ignorance or mistake negates the culpable mental state of the
charged offense. In prosecutions for violations of §§ 39-13-504(a)(4)
and 39-13-522, ignorance or mistake of fact is a defense to prosecution
pursuant to Subsection (c) of this Section.
(b) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact may
constitute a defense to the offense charged, the person may be
convicted of the offense for which the person would be guilty if the
facts were as the person believed.
(c) Mistake of fact in violations of Aggravated Sexual Battery of
a Child and Rape of a Child.
(1) In prosecutions for violations of §§ 39-13-504(a)(4) and 3913-522, ignorance or mistake of fact regarding a victim's age is a
defense to prosecution if the mistake was both honest and reasonable
that the victim was of the age of consent.
(2)
In prosecutions for violations of § 39-13-522, if the
defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct under the honest and
reasonable mistake that the victim was between the ages of thirteen
(13) and seventeen (17), he will be punished according to § 39-13522(d).
(3) A defendant must prove his honest and reasonable mistake
of age under this Subsection by clear and convincing evidence.
Similarly, the Model Penal Code Section 213.6 may be revised
as follows:
Whenever in [an enumerated sexual offense] the criminality of conduct
depends on a child's being below the age of 10, it is no defense that the
actor did not know the child's age; it is a defense for the actor to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he honestly and reasonably
believed the child to be older than a critical age other than 10. When
criminality depends on the child's being below a critical age other than
10, it is a defense for the actor to prove by a preponderance of the
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evidence that he reasonably believed the child to be above the critical
age.
Such modifications would limit punishment to those who
committed the actus reus with the requisite mental culpability while
preserving the policy of punishing those who harm children. The low
burden of proving the accused's negligence in ascertaining the child's
age combined with the higher burden of persuasion of the honest and
reasonable mistake will prove effective in exculpating only those
defendants who engaged in sexual intercourse with one of Myers'
"very few" sexually awakened children, and also honestly believed his
2 55
partner was old enough to consent.
Further, the mere assertion of the defense cannot lead to
exculpation; the trier of fact must conclude that the accused's mistake
was honest and that a reasonable person would have operated under
the same honest mistake. Members of a jury, under the proposed
scheme, would agree (figuratively) that they, too, would have taken
the accused's paramour for a consenting adult in only the rarest of
situations. Put another way, the policies advanced in favor of strict
liability in child rape prosecutions can be effectuated simply by asking
the trier of fact whether an accused's mistake of age was both honest
and reasonable, because, quite frankly, such mistakes almost never
will be. This pragmatic concession notwithstanding, the fact that the
defense is available is important for the maintenance of both a
defendant's rights and the Anglo-American "compound concept" of
crime. A defendant is only likely to successfully assert a mistake of
age defense in the most extreme circumstances, but it is in those
circumstances that a mentally blameless defendant would, and should
be, exonerated.
V. CONCLUSION

The requirement of a finding of a culpable mens rea concurrent
with every element of a criminal offense is a bedrock foundational
principle of Anglo-American criminal law. As Justice Jackson noted
over a half-century ago, the "vicious will" requirement "is no provincial
or transient notion ...[but] is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil." 256 In the context of child rape prosecutions,
this axiom must be recognized and adhered to in order to preserve an

255. Myers, supra note 7, at 132.
256. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
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accused's due process rights. Embedded in law is a notion that
deprivations of liberty are only forced upon those who are criminally
liable for that which they are accused, and that such people are only
those who were mentally as well as physically culpable for their
actions. The Model Penal Code and People v. Hernandez began the
"revolution" by recognizing the compound concept in child rape
prosecutions, but the return of the vicious will requirement will not be
complete until strict liability is no longer imposed for this offense.
However, a blanket, constitutionally mandated mistake of age defense
like the one required in Fremgen is problematic insofar as it ignores
society's need to protect its children and prevent disingenuous
exculpatory defenses. The statutory amendments proposed in this
Note accomplish the dual task of allowing those mentally blameless
defendants to advance an exculpatory defense while still promoting
community and policy concerns.
Just as society would not tolerate sentencing an elderly woman
who inadvertently takes another's coat to twenty years in prison, it
should equally abhor doing the same to a man who engages in sexual
intercourse with a partner he honestly and reasonably mistakenly
believes is a consenting adult. Regardless of the underlying offense,
the compound concept of criminal law is neither a provincial nor
transient notion.
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